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Employers in the United States may empower themselves to remove
from the courts any statutory claim their employees may file against them.
They can compel employees to accept as substitutes for jury trials an
arbitration process governed by their own unilaterally designed rules.
Employers are able to accomplish these remarkable ends by means of
mandatory-arbitration agreements that are non-negotiable conditions of
employment. They may refuse to hire employment applicants who refuse
to sign them' and, it follows, terminate incumbent employees for their
refusals. 2 Mandatory-arbitration agreements are antithetical to arbitration's
long history and usage as a voluntary undertaking.3 They create a tension
with a national "policy against discrimination ' 4 by their frequent coverage
1. See EEOC v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton, & Scripps, 303 F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 2002)
(finding that refusal to hire applicant who refused to sign mandatory-arbitration agreement
is not unlawful retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964), vacated in part
and rev'd en banc in part by Nos. 00-57222 & 01-55321, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 20007
(9th Cir. 2003). The case overrules Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182
(9th Cir. 1998).
2. These agreements are sometimes obtained by placing mandatory-arbitration
language in an employee handbook and including an agreement to be bound by its terms
with a written receipt of the handbook. See O'Neil v. Hilton Head Hosp., 115 F.3d 272, 275
(4th Cir. 1997) (enforcing handbook's mandatory-arbitration clause). Contra Nelson v.
Cyprus Bagdad Copper Corp., 119 F.3d 756, 762 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that an employee,
by signing receipt, did not knowingly agree to employee handbook's mandatory-arbitration
clause).
3. See R.W. FLEMING, THE LABOR ARBITRATION PROCESs 30 (1965) ("With rare
exceptions, such as the railroad rules dispute which Congress ordered submitted to
compulsory arbitration in 1963, [labor arbitration] is voluntary and applies only to the
meaning and interpretation of collective bargaining agreements.").
4. See Emporium Capwell Co. v. W. Addition Cmty. Org., 420 U.S. 50, 70 (1975);
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 45, 47 (1974); see also Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 42 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (reasoning
that the majority's holding eviscerated "the important role played by an independent
judiciary in eradicating employment discrimination."). Gilmer may be read as posing a
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of statutory claims of unlawful discrimination.5  No other industrial
democracy similarly permits employers to escape unconditionally the
jurisdiction conferred by the legislature on its courts.6
This article offers a new approach to the already abundant criticism of
the Supreme Court's decision in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,7
conflict between a national policy against discrimination and a national policy in favor of
arbitration, and resolving it in favor of the latter. A national policy in favor of arbitration is
appropriately found in labor arbitration and other contexts in which arbitration is voluntary.
For examples of how the national policy in favor of arbitration can be erroneously confused
with a non-existent national policy in favor of mandatory arbitration, see Richard M.
Alderman, Pre-Dispute Mandatory Arbitration in Consumer Contracts: A Call for Reform,
38 Hous. L. REV. 1237, 1243-46 (2001). The author states that "[u]ntil the enactment of the
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) in 1925, mandatory arbitration was generally viewed with
hostility by the courts." Id. at 1243 & nn.19-20 (citing history of the FAA which was
enacted mainly because courts tended to view all voluntary arbitration with hostility). Prior
to the FAA, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14, mandatory arbitration was not an option because even
voluntary agreements to arbitrate were unenforceable. See Tobey v. County of Bristol, 23 F.
Cas. 1313, 1320 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 14,065) ("[N]o case has been cited by counsel,
or has fallen within the scope of my researches, in which an agreement to refer a claim to
arbitration, has ever been specifically enforced in equity. So far as the authorities go, they
are altogether the other way."). The error of failing to denote how mandatory arbitration
differs from other kinds of legitimate voluntary arbitration is today a common one in
mandatory-arbitration literature. See, e.g., Christine M. Reilly, Comment, Achieving
Knowing and Voluntary Consent in Pre-Dispute Mandatory Arbitration Agreements at the
Contracting Stage of Employment, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1203 (2002). In a section on the history
of mandatory arbitration, the author cites Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. 36 (1974),
as part of a group of "three mandatory arbitration cases ...." Id. at 1213. She erroneously
describes Gardner-Denver as a case in which "the Supreme Court unanimously held that a
member of the Steelworkers' Union could pursue his racial discrimination claim in court
despite an adverse arbitral ruling pursuant to a mandatory arbitration provision in a
collective bargaining agreement." Id. (emphasis added). The arbitrator's decision in
Gardner-Denver was rendered pursuant to a voluntary-arbitration agreement, freely
negotiated by a union and an employer, covering disputes over the meaning of the
collective-bargaining agreement. Like all grievance-arbitration clauses in collective-
bargaining agreements, the grievance-arbitration clause in the Gardner-Denver case had
none of the deleterious characteristics of a mandatory-arbitration agreement. No grievance-
arbitration clause in a collective-bargaining agreement can fairly be characterized as a
mandatory-arbitration agreement. Similarly, the Gilmer court placed mandatory arbitration
on an equal footing with voluntary arbitration and seemed to consider all arbitration,
whether mandatory or voluntary, as falling within the framework of the national policy
favoring arbitration.
5. There appears to be no limit to the kinds of statutes held subject to mandatory
arbitration. See, e.g., O'Neil, 115 F.3d at 275 (holding that a Family and Medical Leave
Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654, claim is subject to mandatory arbitration).
6. In Germany, for example, the substitution of even voluntary arbitration for a labor
court's jurisdiction over a wrongful termination claim is precluded by Section 101 (2) of the
Labor Court Act. See Michael Kittner & Thomas C. Kohler, Conditioning Expectations:
The Protection of the Employment Bond in German and American Law, 21 COMP. LAB. L.
& POL'Y J. 263, 321 (2000).
7. 500 U.S. 20 (1991). Numerous articles criticize the Supreme Court's Gilmer
decision holding the waiver agreement enforceable. See. e.g.. Reginald Alleyne, Statutory
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holding that the waiver agreement was enforceable.8 If the mandatory-
Discrimination Claims: Rights "Waived" and Lost in the Arbitration Forum, 13 HOFSTRA
LAB. L.J. 381 (1996); Lisa B. Bingham, On Repeat Players, Adhesive Contracts, and the
Use of Statistics in Judicial Review of Employment Arbitration Awards, 29 McGEORGE L.
REV. 223 (1998); Paul D. Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996
SuP. CT. REV. 331; Sarah Rudolph Cole, Incentives and Arbitration: The Case Against
Enforcement of Executory Arbitration Agreements Between Employers and Employees, 64
UMKC L. REV. 449 (1996); Christine Godsil Cooper, Where Are We Going With Gilmer?-
Some Ruminations on the Arbitration of Discrimination Claims, 11 ST. Louis U. PUB. L.
REV. 203 (1992); David E. Feller, Fender Bender or Train Wreck?: The Collision Between
Statutory Protection of Individual Employee Rights and the Judicial Revision of the Federal
Arbitration Act, 41 ST. Louis U. L.J. 561 (1997); Robert A. Gorman, The Gilmer Decision
and the Private Arbitration of Public-Law Disputes, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 635; Joseph R.
Grodin, Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Claims: Doctrine and Policy in the
Wake of Gilmer, 14 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 1 (1996); Margaret M. Harding, The Redefinition of
Arbitration by Those With Superior Bargaining Power, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 857; Sharona
Hoffman, Mandatory Arbitration: Alternative Dispute Resolution or Coercive Dispute
Suppression?, 17 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 131 (1996); Pierre Levy, Comment, Gilmer
Revisited: The Judicial Erosion of Employee Statutory Rights, 26 N.M. L. REV. 455 (1996);
Martin H. Malin & Robert F. Ladenson, Privatizing Justice: A Jurisprudential Perspective
on Labor and Employment Arbitration from the Steelworkers Trilogy to Gilmer, 44
HASTINGS L.J. 1187 (1993); Jennifer N. Manuszak, Pre-Dispute Civil Rights Arbitration in
the Nonunion Sector: The Need for a Tandem Reform Effort at the Contracting, Procedural
and Judicial Review Stages, 12 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. REsOL. 387 (1997); Geraldine Szott
Moohr, Arbitration and the Goals of Employment Discrimination Law, 56 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 395 (1999); David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business:
Employee and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 Wis. L.
REV. 33; Jean R. Stemlight, Mandatory Binding Arbitration and the Demise of the Seventh
Amendment Right to a Jury Trial, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 669 (2001) [hereinafter
Sternlight, Mandatory Binding Arbitration]; Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate
Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court's Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U.
L.Q. 637 (1996); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Rustic Justice: Community and Coercion
Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 77 N.C. L. REV. 931 (1999); Katherine Van Wezel
Stone, Mandatory Arbitration of Individual Employment Rights: The Yellow Dog Contract
of the 1990s, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1017 (1996) [hereinafter Stone, Yellow Dog]; Ronald
Turner, Compulsory Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Claims with Special
Reference to the Three A 's-Access, Adjudication, and Acceptability, 31 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 231 (1996); Judith P. Vladeck, Validity of ADR for Job Disputes: "Yellow Dog
Contracts" Revisited, N.Y. L.J., July 24, 1995, at 7; Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules from
Mandatory Rules: Privatizing Law Through Arbitration, 83 MINN. L. REV. 703 (1999).
Some lower courts have registered implicit criticism of the Gilmer decision by interpreting
it narrowly and refusing to enforce mandatory-arbitration agreements. E.g., Hooters of Am.,
Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1999) (employer unilateral selection of arbitrator
unfair); Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 170 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.
1999) (plaintiff never provided copy of applicable arbitration rules); Duffield v. Robertson
Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 1998) (agreements unenforceable in Title VII
employment discrimination cases); Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir.
1997) (shared-fee clause unenforceable); Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299
(9th Cir. 1994) (agreement failed to describe types of disputes subject to arbitration).
8. My criticism of mandatory arbitration is limited to what is commonly described as
"pre-dispute" mandatory arbitration for statutory claims. Pre-dispute means that the
agreement to arbitrate covers future disputes, usually those involving interpretation of the
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arbitration agreement requires that the employee and employer share the
arbitrator's fee, the employee may be unable to afford it and other
arbitration costs, as the Supreme Court has recently acknowledged.9 Fresh
empirical data indicate that arbitration is not, as it is conventionally thought
to be, an inexpensive means of resolving statutory disputes.1° And if, as the
nearly sole alternative to a shared-fee arrangement, the employer pays the
entire arbitrator's fee, as the mandatory-arbitration agreement in Gilmer
provided, the arbitrator will convey an appearance of partiality: a paid piper
who plays the tune called by the employer. Partiality concerns are
compounded when, as in Gilmer, an employer unilaterally may both select
and compensate the arbitrator."' Both applicants for employment and
contract containing the pre-dispute agreement as part of its terms. All labor-arbitration
agreement clauses in collective-bargaining agreements between unions and employers are
pre-dispute agreements. See BASIC PATrERNS IN UNION CONTRACTS 33-39 (Collective
Bargaining Negotiations and Contracts eds., 14th ed. 1995) [hereinafter BASIC PATrERNS].
Labor arbitration is a model of fair arbitration processes, with agreements to arbitrate
reached voluntarily, mutual selection of the arbitrator, mutual agreement on the procedures
governing the arbitration proceedings, and relatively equal bargaining power between
institutional entities. Voluntary pre-dispute agreements for non-statutory claims do not
involve any deprivation of the right to trial by jury. I also strongly favor the voluntary
arbitration of statutory claims. It provides for both employers and employees the
opportunity to weigh the advantages and disadvantages of arbitration over judicial
proceedings. All references to mandatory arbitration in this article, unless otherwise noted,
are to the pre-dispute arbitration of statutory claims pursuant to an agreement that an
employee must accept as a condition of employment.
9. See Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90 (2000) ("It may well
be that the existence of large arbitration costs could preclude a litigant ... from effectively
vindicating her federal statutory rights in the arbitral forum."). But the burden of proving
excessive and unaffordable fees was placed on the consumer. See generally Michael H.
LeRoy & Peter Feuille, When Is Cost an Unlawful Barrier to Alternative Dispute
Resolution? The Ever Green Tree of Mandatory Employment Arbitration, 50 UCLA L. REV.
143 (2002).
10. See PUBLIC CITIZEN, THE COSTS OF ARBITRATION 3 (2002) (concluding that "in the
vast majority of cases, arbitration will necessarily increase the transaction costs of
litigation."). Contra Samuel Estreicher & Matt Ballard, Affordable Justice Through
Arbitration: A Critique of Public Citizen's Jerema'iad on the "Costs of Arbitration, " DISP.
RESOL. J., Nov. 2002-Jan. 2003, at 8, 10 (arguing that the Public Citizen report fails to
make its case and that "the [forum fee] costs to the employee are relatively low, and often
zero--either as a consequence of employer-promulgated plan design or reallocation by the
arbitrator."). The upfront arbitrator's fee, often required in mandatory-arbitration cases and
its effect on employees, is discussed infra in Section IV(B). See How to Save Time &
Money in Arbitration-Users Speak Up, DIsP. RESOL. J., Aug.-Oct. 2002, at 27, 28
(comment by lawyer Richard Raysman) ("One of the objections from clients of arbitration is
it can be as expensive as litigation without the fight to appeal.").
11. Under the employer-promulgated arbitration rules of the N.Y. Stock Exchange, Mr.
Gilmer's employer selected the panel of arbitrators from which the arbitrator for a statutory
dispute had to be chosen. N.Y. STOCK EXCH. CONSTITUTION AND ARBITRATION RULES art
XI, R. 601(f) & 607 (Dep't of Arbitration, N.Y. Stock Exch., 2003) available at
http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/Rules.pdf. But cf Gilmer 500 U.S. at 30 ("[W]e note that the
NYSE arbitration rules ... provide protection against biased panels."). As discussed infra
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incumbent employees, on signing mandatory-arbitration agreements, are
usually bound to existing and unilaterally promulgated arbitration rules.
12
This arbitration-forum scenario has no counterpart in any American court,
nor would any be tolerated."
in Section V an impartiality standard governs the federal judiciary through the Code of
Conduct adopted by the Judicial Conference of the United States in 1973. Canon 2A of the
Code requires that federal judges "act at all times in a manner that promotes public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary." CODE OF CONDUCT FOR U.S.
JUDGES Canon 2A (1997) available at http://www.uscourts.gov/guide/vol2/chl.html. See
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 111-16 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (finding that trial
judge's public comments created an appearance of partiality).
12. On May 26, 1981, eight days after he was hired by Interstate, Mr. Gilmer completed
and signed a "Uniform Application for Securities Industries Registration Transfer", Gilmer,
500 U.S. at 23, paragraph five of which provided:
I agree to arbitrate any dispute, claim or controversy that may arise between me
and my firm ... that is required to be arbitrated under the rules, constitutions or
bylaws of the organizations with which I register ....
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 895 F.2d 195, 196 n.I (4th Cir. 1990).
The applicable "rule" for Mr. Gilmer was Rule 347 of the N.Y. Stock Exchange, governing
employment disputes:
Any controversy between a registered representative and any member or
member organization arising out of the employment or termination of
employment of such registered representative by and with such member or
member organization shall be settled by arbitration, at the instance of any such
party, in accordance with the arbitration procedure prescribed elsewhere in
these rules.
Id.
13. See Michel G. Picher et al., The Arbitration Profession in Transition: Preliminary
Results from a Survey of the National Academy of Arbitrators, 52 NAT'L AcAD. ARB. 241,
260 app. B (1999) The survey statement posed was: "If fees are paid entirely by one party,
the arbitration process is compromised." The results were that 15% of respondents strongly
disagreed, 30% disagreed, 21% neither disagreed nor agreed, 21% agreed, and 14% strongly
agreed. Id. at 262 fig.15. Of the NAA's 599 members, 77%, participated in the survey.
Sixty-four members (11%) had been inactive over the four years immediately preceding the
survey and so were not eligible to participate in it; thus, 86% of eligible members
participated. Id. at 245-46.
Some respondent arbitrators made revealing statements about their knowledge of
distinctions between the appearance of partiality and actual partiality. Those who responded
that the source of fees does not matter commented as follows:
I don't have a problem with who pays-I call it the way I see it as long as I get
paid for it by someone.
Perception of fairness is not the same as arbitrator's neutrality and integrity.
Integrity is integrity.
Id. at 261.
Other respondents who said that the source of fees does matter relied almost exclusively on
the appearance factor:
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Accepting that adhesion contracts are, nevertheless, enforceable, 4 this
article posits that the adhesive nature of mandatory-arbitration agreements
is an element to be considered in determining congressional intent
concerning their enforcement. I argue that the consequences of judicial
enforcement of mandatory-arbitration agreements also have a bearing on
the issue of congressional intent; mandatory-arbitration agreements are so
demonstrably bizarre that Congress could not have intended their
enforcement." This article further seeks to demonstrate how a textualist
approach to statutory interpretation can fail: the Federal Arbitration Act,
heavily relied upon by the Gilmer court, was never intended to cover
involuntary arbitration of any kind, and particularly involuntary arbitration
agreements governing the interpretation of statutes. 7  The very term
The appearance of undue influence by one party taints the process.
Who pays the piper calls the tune.
You don't bite the hand that feeds you.
Even if an arbitrator is scrupulously fair, he or she must retain the appearance of
neutrality by equal division of the fee.
Id.
14. But see Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96
HARV. L. REV. 1173 (1983); W. David Slawson, Mass Contracts: Lawful Fraud in
California, 48 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1974) (arguing that adhesion contracts amount to fraud in
many cases). Professor Rakoff's view, that adhesion contracts should be presumptively
unenforceable, has not found favor in the courts, and the small number of pre-Gilmer cases
that had held mandatory-arbitration agreements unenforceable on adhesion contract grounds
have since been overruled by Gilmer. See Rakoff, supra, at 1266 n.279 and accompanying
text (citing Wheeler v. St. Joseph Hosp., 133 Cal. Rptr. 775 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976); Bd. of
Educ. v. W. Harley Miller, Inc., 236 S.E.2d 439 (W. Va. 1977)).
15. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 514 (1947) ("And we refuse to interpret the
rules at this time so as to reach so harsh and unwarranted a result."). The "harsh and
unwarranted result" in Hickman would have been the discovery of a lawyer's "files and
mental processes" by the lawyer's adversaries. Id. The Hickman decision is now codified
in part as FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
16. Textualism is the interpretation of a statute without consulting legislative history
and other sources outside the text of the statute. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Common-Law
Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the
Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 3, 17 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
Cf HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN
THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1374-80 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P.
Frickey eds., 1994) (expounding an anti-textualist or nontextualist view). Individual
statutes, like the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634
(2000), say nothing about mandatory arbitration. But see Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 29 (1991) (relying on the absence of a mandatory-arbitration ban in the
ADEA to partially support the conclusion that such clauses are enforceable).
17. The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), a 1925 statute, codified at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14
(2000), provides for the enforcement of agreements to arbitrate but is entirely silent on the
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"mandatory arbitration" is a contradiction that falls outside the definition of
arbitration as supported by its history and common usage. Finally, the
article posits that courts, through the enforcement of mandatory-arbitration
agreements, are not empowered to override congressional commands on
190federal court venue," subject matter jurisdiction, ° judicial rules of civil
procedure, and the right to trial by jury as guaranteed by statute 1 and the
Constitution.22
I. THE GILMER CASE
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. fired six-year employee Robert Gilmer
from his position as Senior Vice President, Manager of Mutual Funds,23
when he was sixty-two years old.24 Following the text of the federal Age
enforcement of mandatory-arbitration agreements. In Gilmer, the Court did not address
Justice Stevens' dissenting view that the FAA does not cover involuntary agreements to
arbitrate, 500 U.S. at 42 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("In my opinion, arbitration clauses
contained in employment agreements are specifically exempt from coverage of the FAA,
and for that reason [employer] cannot ... compel petitioner to submit his claims arising
under the [ADEA] to binding arbitration.") Id. at 36.
18. See FLEMING, supra note 3, at 30 ("'[A]bitration' in the industrial context clearly
means grievance arbitration. With rare exceptions ... it is voluntary .... ). From the
perspective of an employee covered by a collective-bargaining agreement, arbitration might
appear to be non-voluntary in the sense that the union controls the decision whether to
arbitrate. But the collective-bargaining agreement is between the union and the employer,
not the employer and the employee. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967) (holding that
only in the extraordinary circumstance of a union's breach of its obligation to fairly
represent employees may an employee bring an action against the employer for breach of
the collective-bargaining agreement).
19. 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (2000) (providing for federal court venue).
20. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000) (specifying federal court subject matter jurisdiction).
21. E.g., The Age Discrimination In Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(2)
(2000) ("[A] person shall be entitled to a trial by jury of any issue of fact in any such
action .... "); the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (providing for federal
court jurisdiction). Most of the discrimination statutes that generate disputes over
mandatory-arbitration clauses provide for the fight to a trial by jury. JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL
ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 11.6 (3d ed. 1999) ("Congress clearly has the power to confer
broader jury trial rights than those guaranteed by the Seventh Amendment."). In addition,
state statutory and constitutional provisions that confer employment and consumer rights
often provide for the right to a jury trial. See, e.g., Kloss v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 54 P.3d
1, 8-9 (Mont. 2002) (providing an eight-factor test to determine whether an arbitration
clause that waives a state constitutional fight is an adhesion contract).
22. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
23. Petition for Writ of Certiorari for Petitioner at 40a, Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson
Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991) (No. 90-18), microformed on U.S. Supreme Court Records
and Briefs (CIS) (including the unpublished decision from the United States District Court
for Western District of North Carolina) (McMillan, J.).
24. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 23 (1991). Mr. Gilmer was
not a job applicant, as one commentator assumed. See Theodore J. St. Antoine, The
Changing Role of Labor Arbitration, 76 IND. L. J. 83, 87 (2001) [hereinafter St. Antoine,
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Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), which provides for
federal court venue and federal court subject matter jurisdiction 2 over
ADEA cases, Mr. Gilmer filed an age discrimination claim in federal
district court. He sought lost wages and benefits, reinstatement, and
26 2attorney's fees. He also demanded a jury trial.27 Interstate filed a motion
to dismiss the complaint and to compel arbitration on the basis of Mr.
Gilmer's signed registration application, in which, among other things, he
agreed to arbitrate any claims he had against his employer,2 ' The federal
district court denied the motion.29 The Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit reversed,3° and the Supreme Court affirmed.3
The Court determined that the right to a federal court forum and jury
32trial for a federal age-discrimination claim could be waived by an
employee's prior agreement to arbitrate the claim and that, like the Federal
Arbitration Act,33 nothing in the ADEA precluded enforcement of the
agreement. 34 That the agreement was offered as a condition of employment
Changing Role] ("[I]t can be argued that job applicants like Gilmer have less of an equity in
their jobs than an incumbent employee such as Alexander may have [had] in Gardner-
Denver.").
25. 29 U.S.C § 633a(c) (2000) ("Any person aggrieved may bring a civil action in any
Federal district court .... ).
26. Petition for Writ of Cert., supra note 23, at 39a.
27. Id. at 42a.
28. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23-24; Petition for Writ of Cert., supra note 23, at 39a.
29. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 24; Petition for Writ of Cert., supra note 23, at 39a-42a
(reprinting unpublished district court opinion).
30. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 895 F.2d 195, 203 (4th Cir. 1990).
31. A question left unanswered in Gilmer was whether the Federal Arbitration Act,
providing for judicial enforcement of agreements to arbitrate, excluded employment
contracts from its coverage. See supra note 17; Feller, supra note 7, at 569. The text of the
FAA states that "nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment of
seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate
commerce." 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2000). The Court, in a later case, decided that this phrase was
meant to include contracts of employment, except for those employees engaged in interstate
transportation. See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 120-21 (2001).
32. 29 U.S.C. §§ 626(c)(2), 633a(c) (2000).
33. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (2000).
34. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26. Professor David Feller has written that Gilmer did not
address the question of whether employers may make the agreement to arbitrate statutory
disputes a condition of employment. He describes the Court as saying, instead, that there
"was an agreement between businessmen who knew what they were doing and could not
therefore be refused enforcement on the ground that it was adhesive and oppressive." See
Feller, supra note 7, at 573. Gilmer's limitation to businessmen and non-application to non-
businessmen is difficult to envision, particularly when, as Professor Feller accurately
acknowledged, the Gilmer decision was motivated by a desire to "avoid litigation and clear
the dockets by enforcing agreements to arbitrate all disputes and including within that
objective claims of violation of protective legislation." Id. at 572. Also, the Gilmer court
likely perceived that it had no need to address an adhesion contract issue, because it is so
well settled that adhesion contracts are generally enforceable. See generally Rakoff, supra
note 14 (discussing the enforcement of adhesion contracts).
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is not discussed in the opinion. Nor does the opinion discuss the
ramifications of the employer's ability to select unilaterally the candidates
for the panel from which the arbitrator would be chosen. Finally, it does
not discuss the employer's self-conferred authority to compensate the
arbitrator and make the rules governing the arbitration proceeding.35
Mr. Gilmer, the Court held, would not be harmed by the agreed-upon
switch to arbitration because his arbitrator would be bound to follow
36substantive federal age-discrimination law, and the procedures
unilaterally set up by the employer to govern the arbitration proceedings
were not unfair.37 There was no inequality of bargaining power, in part
because Mr. Gilmer was an "experienced businessman. 38 The Court was
35. See supra note 11 (discussing N.Y. Stock Exchange Rules 601 & 607).
36. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26.
37. Id. at 33.
38. Id. Evidence that anyone has ever negotiated their way out of a mandatory-
arbitration agreement is either scarce or nonexistent. Indeed, employers are advised not to
negotiate over the terms of mandatory-arbitration clauses. In an article designed to provide
employers with help drafting mandatory-arbitration clauses, one attorney advises "[t]he
employer should not negotiate any terms of the arbitration agreement .... Any requests to
modify or eliminate the arbitration agreement should be flatly rejected, with the explanation
that it is a company-wide policy that cannot be adjusted for any individual employee."
David M. Benck, So Your Company Wants to Implement an Employment Arbitration
Program: A Step-By-Step Guide, DisP. RESOL. J. Nov. 2002-Jan. 2003, at 16, 18. See also
Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 690 (Cal. 2000) ("[Flew
employees are in a position to refuse a job because of an arbitration requirement.").
But a recent decision affirmed a motion to compel arbitration and found no adhesion
contract because the plaintiff had an opportunity to ask questions about it and consult an
attorney:
The employment application was not offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.
Defendant gave plaintiff an opportunity to ask questions about the application
and to take it with her for further quiet review or, perhaps, consultation with
family, friends, or a professional such as an attorney. Plaintiff herself was an
educated person who was experienced in the field of human resources. Nothing
in the record indicates that plaintiff asked to alter any terms of the application or
that Sandvik would have refused to consider her for the position if she did not
assent to the arbitration provision as presented. Accordingly, we are not
persuaded that plaintiff was forced to sign an inflexible contract of adhesion in
the circumstances of her completion of the Application for Employment.
Martindale v. Sandvik, Inc., 800 A.2d 872, 881 (N.J. 2002). The opinion avoids the key
question: having consulted with family, friends, and an attorney, could the plaintiff have
negotiated her way out of the mandatory-arbitration agreement or any of its terms? As the
Supreme Court did in Gilmer, the court confused inability to understand an agreement with
ability to negotiate the terms of the agreement. Many terms of computer program
agreements are understandable but entirely non-negotiable; one must either click on "I
agree" or the installation process is terminated.
In Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985), a contract providing the
basis for personal jurisdiction was attacked by the defendants on grounds of inequality of
bargaining power. The Court rejected the argument and approved the lower court's
appraisal of defendants as "experienced and sophisticated businessmen," noting that one of
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accurate in premising that arbitrators in statutory-claim cases are bound by
the substantive law of the statute in dispute. 39 But important procedural
norms-like liberal discovery, ° can sometimes govern substantive
outcome' Yet, they were scarcely discussed in Gilmer.42
In one of the cases cited in Gilmer, the Court said that "[n]othing...
prevents a party from excluding statutory claims from the scope of an
agreement to arbitrate."'43  The statement is tantamount to an adhesion
contract disclaimer. It might have been validly made in the employer-
employer context presented in the Mitsubishi" case, but no such statement
can be validly made about the negotiation of mandatory arbitration
agreements covering an individual's employment or consumer rights.45
them "for five months conducted negotiations with Burger King over the terms of the
franchise and lease agreements .. " Id. at 484-85. In The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore
Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972), the Court considered whether to enforce an agreement containing a
forum-selection clause. It found the agreement to have been "freely negotiated" and that
there was no "overweening bargaining power." Id. at 12. No such findings were made, nor
could they likely have been made, in Gilmer.
39. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26.
40. Id. at 31; cf FED. R. Civ. P. 26.
41. The scope of allowed discovery, for example, can have a particularly heavy bearing
on the outcome of statutory discrimination claims, in which required proof elements of
motive and intent can only be met through extensive discovery. See Deborah R. Hensler,
Judging Arbitration, 54 NAT'L ACAD. ARB. 123 (2001) (examining how individuals are
attentive to procedural characteristics in judging the fairness of a dispute resolution
process); Cass R. Sunstein, Lessons from a Debacle: From Impeachment to Reform, 51 FLA.
L. REV. 599, 613 (1999) (explaining the impact of discovery on the substantive outcome in
sexual harassment cases); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2000) (authorizing the Supreme Court
to "prescribe general rules of practice and procedure and rules of evidence for cases in the
United States district courts ...."). It makes all rules that "abridge, enlarge or modify any
substantive right" a nullity. Id. Employers who unilaterally craft mandatory-arbitration
clauses are not similarly restrained.
42. The dissenting opinion in Gilmer is mainly confined to the FAA's inapplicability.
500 U.S. 36.
43. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628
(1985).
44. Id.
45. See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989);
Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987). Since these two
securities industry cases were decided in favor of enforcing mandatory-arbitration
agreements in disputes between brokerage houses and their customers, the securities
industry has had second thoughts about the utility of mandatory arbitration. Disputants and
some members of the securities industry successfully pressured the industry to abandon the
mandatory-arbitration clause requirement. See SEC Order Approving Proposed NASD Rule
Change, 64 Fed. Reg. 59,815 (Nov. 3, 1999); NASD Proposed Rule Relating to Arbitration
of Employment Discrimination Claims, 62 Fed. Reg. 66, 164 (proposed Dec. 17, 1997)
(discussing congressional and regulatory pressures for changing the mandatory system);
DAVID S. RUDER ET AL., SECURITIES ARBITRATION REFORM: REPORT OF THE ARBITRATION
POLICY TASK FORCE 8-9, 17-20 (1996); Sarah Rudolph Cole, Uniform Arbitration: "One
Size Fits All" Does Not Fit, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 759, 766 n.28 and
accompanying text (2001) [hereinafter Cole, Uniform Arbitration].
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The power to not hire those who refuse to sign mandatory-arbitration
46agreements makes it unnecessary for employers to negotiate over them.
Gilmer is silent on these issues: fundamental and important distinctions
between different kinds of arbitration proceedings are not discussed in the
opinion. The Court was also silent on the question whether arbitration over
the interpretation of contract or statutory terms can ever be anything but
voluntary, at least in the absence of an authorizing statute.
II. ARBITRATION PARLANCE
Neither the term labor arbitration nor employment arbitration appears
in the Supreme Court's four decisions on mandatory arbitration.47 Gilmer
takes the positive attributes of labor arbitration, involving institutional
parties on both sides and procedural rules mutually negotiated by
employers and unions, and apparently equates them with the entirely
distinct mandatory-arbitration process. By not acknowledging distinctions
48between different kinds of arbitration processes, the Court was able to
reconcile its rejection, in 1974, of the voluntary labor arbitration model as a
forum for statutory claims,49 with its acceptance, seventeen years later in
Gilmer, of mandatory arbitration as a forum for statutory claims. 50  For
example, the Supreme Court has described the arbitration of a statutory
antitrust dispute between two corporations as an elected trade of "the
procedures and opportunity for review of the courtroom for the simplicity,
informality, and expedition of arbitration., 5 This sweeping description of
arbitration does not seem to acknowledge that it would scarcely be possible
to resolve a complex antitrust case simply and expeditiously by agreeing to
its resolution by arbitration. The massive amounts of evidence often
required to prove or defend against an antitrust claim would be the same in
both an arbitration and a judicial forum. When arbitration proceedings are
46. EEOC v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton, & Scripps, 303 F.3d 994, 1006 (9th Cir. 2002),
vacated in part and rev'd en banc in part by Nos. 00-57222 & 01-55321, 2003 U.S. App.
LEXIS 20007 (9th Cir. 2003).
47. See EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279 (2002); Circuit City Stores v.
Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001); Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000);
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
48. See Julius G. Getman, Labor Arbitration and Dispute Resolution, 88 YALE. L.J.
916, 917 (1979).
49. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. 36, 49 (1974) ("Title VII's purpose and
procedures strongly suggest that an individual does not forfeit his private cause of action if
he first pursues his grievance to final arbitration ....").
50. In the intervening line of cases, decided after Gardner-Denver and before Gilmer,
the Court expressly found no adhesion element in the disputed arbitration agreements. See,
e.g., McMahon, 482 U.S. at 234; Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Inc.,
473 U.S. 614, 624-28 (1985).
51. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628.
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those in which "simplicity, informality, and expedition" prevail,52 it is not
for the reason that complex cases become simple cases because they are
arbitrated. Rather, it is the relative simplicity of the issues ordinarily
submitted to arbitration. Labor arbitration, for example, is a process
designed for relatively simple cases. Arbitration generally, and of
54necessity, becomes a complex process when used for complex cases .
A. Labor, Employment, and Mandatory Arbitration Compared
The gap separating labor, employment, and mandatory arbitration is
both wide and deep.55 Labor arbitration is the voluntary arbitration of
disputes between unions and employers pursuant to terms negotiated by
equally qualified participants. Unlike mandatory arbitration, the attributes
of labor arbitration are almost uniformly regarded as positive.56 The
misused analogy might in part explain why the Gilmer Court found
mandatory arbitration sufficiently attractive for compelled use in the
resolution of statutory claims. Voluntary employment arbitration and
52. Id. Typical labor arbitration issues are those involving disciplinary warnings,
suspensions and discharges, overtime pay, working out of classification, and seniority. See
BASIC PATTERNS, supra note 8, at 33-39.
53. Typical labor arbitration issues over the interpretation of collective-bargaining
agreements include discharge and discipline cases. BASIC PATrERNS, supra note 8, at 35.
Many involve disciplinary warnings and suspensions, overtime work, lunch rest and cleanup
provisions, eligibility for holiday pay, vacation pay, unpaid sick leave, and seniority. Id. at
vii-xi (Table of Contents). These constitute the "major types of provisions and their
frequency in collective bargaining contracts." Id. at v.
54. See Wolfe v. Schwab, NYSE Arb. Docket No. 1993-003197 (Aug. 19, 1994), at
http://scan.cch.com/aad/199408/1993-001397.pdf (involving a complex sexual harassment
case in a mandatory-arbitration proceeding that required fifty-five days of hearings).
55. The American Arbitration Association maintains a set of rules for different kinds of
arbitration, among them rules for labor arbitration and employment arbitration. See LABOR
ARBITRATION RULES (Am. Arbitration Ass'n 2002), at http://www.adr.org (last visited Oct.
27, 2003); NATIONAL RULES FOR THE RESOLUTION OF EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES (Am.
Arbitration Ass'n 2002), at http://www.adr.org (last visited Oct. 28, 2003) [hereinafter
RULES FOR EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES]. The employment arbitration rules suggest their
applicability to four different kinds of employment arbitration: "pre-dispute, voluntary final
and binding arbitration; pre-dispute, mandatory non-binding arbitration; pre-dispute,
mandatory final and binding arbitration; or post-dispute, voluntary final and binding
arbitration." RULES FOR EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES supra, at heading "Designing an ADR
Program".
56. See Getman, supra note 48, at 916 ("It is understandable that labor arbitration is
widely admired."). Professor Getman's article challenges the assumption that labor
arbitration can be "routinely applied, with only minor adjustments, in other situations." Id.
at 917 (footnote omitted). Praise for the labor arbitration process and labor arbitrators
generally is replete in the Supreme Court's Steelworkers' Trilogy cases. See United
Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); United
Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United
Steelworkers of Am. v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
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mandatory arbitration for statutory disputes also have a widely different
character.
Voluntary employment arbitration, as distinguished from voluntary
labor arbitration, is ordinarily the arbitration of disputes between employers
and employees who are not represented by unions. Labor arbitration,
employment arbitration, and mandatory arbitration have different cultures,
and they employ different arbitrators with different experiences, for
different kinds of cases.57  They operate under different kinds of
procedures, including starkly different means of compensating arbitrators.
Labor arbitration parties have an ongoing relationship involving the
administration of their collective-bargaining agreement through
negotiations for its formation and day-to-day governance under its terms,
including the grievance-arbitration processes, to resolve disputes over its
58meaning. Labor arbitration avoids judicial trials of contractual
grievances. It also has the objective of avoiding strikes, lockouts, boycotts,
and other disruptive activities over grievances.59 Employment arbitration
parties have a different relationship. Voluntary employment arbitration is
not part of an on-going adversarial relationship as is labor arbitration. 60 It
is ad hoc for particular disputes having little or nothing to do with an
underlying contractual relationship, as typified by a collective-bargaining
agreement.
Distinctions between labor arbitration and mandatory arbitration are
more stark. They evolved for different reasons. Unions were attracted to
labor arbitration as an expeditious means of resolving disputes over
collective-bargaining agreement terms with which judges had little
experience. Employers offered virtually no resistance, having gained the
reciprocal advantage of a no-strike clause during the life of the collective-
bargaining agreement. 6' The Supreme Court has described labor arbitrators
as experts in the "law of the shop," meaning that through training and
57. Labor arbitrators, for example, are compensated on a per diem basis. Employment
arbitrators are generally compensated on an hourly basis.
58. See Calvert Magruder, A Half Century of Legal Influence upon the Development of
Collective Bargaining, 50 HARV. L. REv. 1071, 1113 (1937) (discussing the moral
obligations of the parties maintaining collective-bargaining agreements); Judith A.
McMorrow, The Advocate as Witness: Understanding Context, Culture and Client, 70
FORDHAM L. REv. 945, 980 (2001) (describing the culture of labor arbitration as an ongoing
constructive relationship).
59. See FLEMING, supra note 3, at 31-32. ("Indeed, it is apparent that the decisions of
the Supreme Court which have so greatly enhanced labor arbitration ... are in large part
based on the theory that the arbitration clause is the quid pro quo for the no-strike clause."
(citing Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957)).
60. See CHARLES S. LACUGNA, AN INTRODUCTION TO LABOR ARBITRATION 2 (1988)
("Arbitration, by definition, is voluntary because parties freely agree to arbitrate a labor
dispute.").
61. FLEMING, supra note 3, at 31-32.
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experience they tend to be experts in the subject matter of disputes limited
62to interpretation of collective-bargaining agreements. Mandatory-
arbitration agreements are unilaterally crafted by employers primarily to
protect them from the consequences of jury trials for statutory claims.63
Most labor arbitration cases are heard and decided by a core body of
seasoned experts. They are almost never attorneys who practice labor or
employment law.64 Many are members of the National Academy of
Arbitrators, an organization that conditions membership on labor
arbitration experience and adherence to its Code of Professional
66Responsibility. Labor arbitrators nearly always resolve disputes over the
meaning of collective-bargaining agreements. 6' They only occasionally
interpret statutes, and only when the collective-bargaining agreement
authorizes them to do so. Voluntary employment arbitration, by definition,
never involves the interpretation of collective-bargaining agreements.6 s
Contrary to the prevailing view outside the labor and employment bar,
labor arbitrators are not the dominant players in employment arbitration
cases. Employment arbitrators, including those who hear and decide
statutory-claim, mandatory-arbitration cases, tend not to be drawn entirely
62. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co. 363 U.S. 574, 582
(1960).
63. See Barry A. Macey, Response to Theodore J. St. Antoine and Michael C. Harper,
76 IND. L.J. 135, 136 (2001) ("Employers impose these [mandatory] arbitration
arrangements for one reason and one reason only-to avoid jury trials."); Mei L. Bickner et
al., Developments in Employment Arbitration, DIsp. RES. J., Jan. 1997, at 8, 10-11 (reporting
that interviewed employers prefer arbitration over trials because they fear jury trials for
employment cases and want to avoid the time and expense of litigation). It is undisputed
that as between juries and arbitrators, juries provide larger damages awards than arbitrators.
See Susanne Craig, Prudential Unit Faces Payoutfor Damages, WALL ST. J., Oct. 14, 2002,
at Cl ("A $250 million punitive-damage award levied ... against Prudential Securities Inc.
by a state-court jury is a vivid example of why the securities industry long has pushed to get
most investor disputes into private arbitration.").
64. See Picher et al., supra note 13, at 246-47, 252-55.
65. CONSTITUTION AND BY-LAWS art. VI (Nat'l Acad. Of Arbitrators 2000) in GLADYS
W. GRUENBERG ET AL., THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS: FIFTY YEARS IN THE
WORLD OF WORK 329, 330 app. B (1997), available at http://naarb.org/const-bylaws.html
(last visited Oct. 28, 2003); MEMBERSHIP REQUIREMENTS (Nat'l Acad. Of Arbitrators 2000),
at http://naarb.org/member-guidelines.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2003).
66. CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY (Nat'l Acad. Of Arbitrators 2000) in GRUENBERG
ET AL., supra note 65, at 345 app. C, available at http://naarb.org/code.html (last visited
Aug. 26, 2003).
67. It is settled that labor arbitration grievances not covered by the collective-
bargaining agreement are not within the scope of a typical labor-arbitration clause and are
not arbitrable. See discussion of Steelworkers' Trilogy cases, supra note 56.
68. See Paul L. Edenfield, Note, No More the Independent and Virtuous Judiciary?:
Triaging Antidiscrimination Policy in a Post-Gilmer World, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1321, 1329-
32 (2002) (criticizing the Court's reliance on employment arbitration as an appropriate
forum for the vindication of statutory rights).
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from labor arbitrator ranks. 69 They are often law firm associates or partners
who are not labor law specialists. This different source from which
statutory-claim arbitrators are drawn for employment cases creates
dramatically different arbitrator compensation structures for labor
arbitration and mandatory-arbitration processes. In ad hoc voluntary
employment arbitration, an employee who voluntarily agrees to arbitrate a
statutory claim or other employment-related claim voluntarily agrees to
bear the costs of the employment arbitration, including the known fees of
the mutually chosen arbitrator. The voluntary nature of labor arbitration
means, similarly, that both union and employer parties have consented to
bear the selected arbitrator's known per diem fees and other related
expenses.
Unlike both voluntary employment arbitration and mandatory
arbitration, labor arbitration contestants are always institutions. Though
employment arbitration lacks the uniform institutional-contestants
character of labor arbitration, negotiations of some kind ordinarily precede
the agreement to arbitrate. This impetus for employer-employee
negotiations differs from that of labor-management negotiations for a
collective-bargaining agreement. The employment-arbitration agreement is
ad hoc and between parties who may never again have a dispute of any
kind with each other. In all of these respects, the collective-bargaining
agreement is the polar opposite of the non-negotiated and unilaterally
imposed mandatory-arbitration agreement, particularly with respect to the
manner of compensating the arbitrator.
B. Compulsory and Mandatory Arbitration Compared
The words "mandatory arbitration" do not appear in the Gilmer
decision. Instead, the Court substituted for them the term "compulsory
arbitration. 70 This may suggest the Court's unfamiliarity with arbitration's
69. See Picher et al., supra note 13, at 254 tbl.l (presenting results of survey of
members of National Academy of Arbitrators).
70. In Gilmer, the Supreme Court described the question presented in the case as
"whether a claim under the [ADEA] can be subjected to compulsory arbitration pursuant to
an arbitration agreement in a securities registration application." Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 23 (1991) (emphasis added). The Court also
read Mr. Gilmer's argument as asserting "that compulsory arbitration is improper because it
deprives claimants of the judicial forum provided for by the ADEA." Id. at 29. In Sinclair
Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 218 (1962) (Brennan, J., dissenting), the dissenting
opinion used the term "mandatory arbitration" to describe a statutory provision requiring
arbitration under the Railway Labor Act. In Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S.
105 (2001) the opinion of the Court does not use the term "mandatory arbitration," but the
dissenting opinion does. EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279 (2002), appears to be
the first Supreme Court opinion in which the opinion for the Court uses the term
"mandatory arbitration." The majority opinion, written by Justice Stevens, one of the
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nuances.7 Compulsory arbitration in the United States means arbitration
72commanded by statute. What is now labeled mandatory arbitration has a
pervasive element of compulsion. It otherwise differs dramatically from
what is commonly understood in the labor-management relations
community to be "compulsory arbitration." Mandatory-arbitration
agreements are created by adhesion contract. Compulsory arbitration is
always created by statute. Compulsory arbitration, as so ordered by statute,
commands arbitration over contract formation disputes, rarely for grievance
disputes, and usually those for public sector safety personnel.73 Mandatory
arbitration, as ordered by adhesion contract, commands arbitration over the
meaning of statutes that protect individual rights.74 Compulsory arbitration
dissenters in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, mentions "mandatory arbitration" three
times. Justice Thomas, author of the dissenting opinion in Waffle House, and joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia, uses the term "mandatory arbitration" only once,
in quoting from the majority's opinion. Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 311. The Court is
divided 5-4 over the nomenclature of mandatory arbitration. This is more than a semantic
difference. The Justices who refuse to use the term mandatory arbitration are, not
coincidentally, those who most firmly support the Gilmer status quo, as the divisions in
Circuit City and Waffle House reflect. The Ninth Circuit's decision in EEOC v. Luce,
Forward, Hamilton, & Scripps, 303 F.3d 994 (2002), vacated in part and rev'd en banc in
part by Nos. 00-57222 & 01-55321, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 20007 (9th Cir. 2003),
overruling an earlier decision making mandatory-arbitration agreements unenforceable in
Title VII cases, avoids the term "mandatory arbitration" and uses the term "compulsory
arbitration" throughout the opinion.
71. In a 1974 speech to a bar group, then Associate Justice William Rehnquist said, "If
you had wanted a speaker who was highly knowledgeable in the nuances of arbitration, you
most assuredly would not have chosen me." William H. Rehnquist, A Jurist's View of
Arbitration, 32 ARB. J. 1 (1977).
72. See LACUGNA, supra note 60 at 2 (noting as a generalization that arbitration is
voluntary and that "compulsory arbitration" is an exception). Compulsory arbitration
statutes require "the determination of wages, hours, and working conditions by a third party
other than representatives of employers and employees, and provisions requiring that such
determination be final and binding for a specified period of time." HERBERT R. NORTHRUP,
COMPULSORY ARBITRATION AND GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN LABOR DISPUTES 9 (1966).
One author's book about mandatory arbitration has the title, COMPULSORY ARBITRATION.
See RICHARD A. BALES, COMPULSORY ARBITRATION (1997). The author defines arbitration
as a proceeding "voluntarily chosen by parties." Id. at 3. He then immediately defines a
"compulsory employment arbitration agreement" as "an agreement between employer and
employee to resolve future employment disputes by arbitration." Id. The book does not
acknowledge either in this definition or anywhere in the book that a mandatory-arbitration
agreement ("compulsory" in his terms) must be signed as a condition of employment, except
as suggested in a chapter on the drafting of "compulsory arbitration agreements." Id. at
116-20.
73. Before the proliferation of public sector collective-bargaining statutes, beginning in
the late 1960's, compulsory arbitration was limited to efforts to limit strikes in vital
industries during the two World Wars. It was also limited to five states, Florida, Indiana,
New Jersey, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin, all seeking to limit strikes by public utilities
employees. See NORTHRUP, id. at 15-34.
74. Id.
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for individual employee grievances is a rarity in the United States.75
Compulsory arbitration in the absence of an authorizing statute is
unknown.76 In sum, and ironically as a result of Gilmer, forced arbitration
over the meaning of contracts requires an authorizing statute. Forced
arbitration over the meaning of statutes, however, requires no authorizing
statute. It only requires, according to Gilmer, the absence of a prohibiting
statute.
Apart from important questions of statutory authorization, there are
structural differences between compulsory and mandatory arbitration.
They bear on both the question of mandatory arbitration's fundamental
fairness and its utility. Unlike compulsory arbitration, mandatory
arbitration in employment cases provides for employers the advantage of
structuring the procedures governing the arbitration, including those that
bear on statutory substantive outcome. 77  When parties are forced to
arbitrate under compulsory arbitration statutes, the basic rules governing
the arbitration are generally created by the statute, certainly not by one of
the parties to the arbitration.7"
III. REACTION TO GILMER
A. Lower Courts
Several lower court decisions illustrate a pattern of judicial unease
with Gilmer.79 One lower court decision is so critical of Gilmer that the
dissenting opinion criticizes the majority opinion for its criticism of
Gilmer.80  Another court struck down a statutory-claim mandatory-
arbitration agreement on the ground that it was procedurally unfair for the
75. BALES, supra note 72, at 16.
76. See Editorial, Right Way on the Railroad, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 1963, at 14;
Hedrick Smith, Senators Speed Bill to Provide Rail Arbitration, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 1963,
at 1. The Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (2000), among other things, provides
for compulsory arbitration of grievance disputes in industries covered by the statute:
railroads and airlines.
77. E.g., supra note 11 (specifying the unilaterally promulgated N.Y. Stock Exchange
arbitrator rules).
78. E.g., NORTHRUP, supra note 73, at 9 ("Compulsory arbitration statutes set forth a
procedure for invoking arbitration, for selecting the arbitrator (either on an ad hoc, or case-
by-case basis, or establishment of a permanent arbitrator or arbitration board), and usually
also provide... for refusal to abide by them.").
79. See supra note 7, where some cited commentators discuss the opinions narrowly
interpreting Gilmer.
80. Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1489 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(Henderson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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employer unilaterally to select the arbitrator."' Though the decision may
fairly be viewed as a totality-of-circumstances decision, it did consider the
single element of unilateral arbitrator selection by the employer as a
procedure "that is crafted to ensure a biased decision maker. 82 A finding
of arbitrator bias is always a basis for vacating an arbitrator's award. In
Gilmer, the employer also unilaterally selected the arbitrator, but the
Supreme Court did not equate unilateral selection of the arbitrator with a
per se finding of arbitrator bias.83
Of the many mandatory-arbitration procedural issues emanating from
Gilmer, lower court decisions suggest that the arbitrator-fee issue presents
the most serious challenge to Gilmer's premise that the switch from a
judicial forum to an arbitration forum is no more than a transfer of forum.
Post-Gilmer decisions have held the shared-arbitrator-fee portion of the
84mandatory-arbitration agreement unenforceable in statutory-claim cases.
As a remedy, they have substituted a requirement that the employer pay the
entire arbitrator's fee.85 Other courts have used the shared-arbitrator-fee
clause as a partial basis for concluding that the entire mandatory-arbitration
81. Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 938-39 (4th Cir. 1999).
82. Id. at 938.
83. See DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL FOR MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION OF STATUTORY
DISPUTES ARISING OUT OF THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP (Am. Bar Ass'n 1995)
[hereinafter DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL], available at http://www.bna.com/bnabooks/ababna/
special/protocol.pdf (last visited Oct. 28, 2003). The Protocol was created by members of
arbitrator organizations, the bar, and alternative dispute resolution providers in an effort to
lessen the impact of Gilmer. It recommends mutual arbitrator selection. Even without
unilateral arbitrator selection, mandatory arbitration would still provide employers with a
substantial net advantage over employees. It has been argued that employers are
disadvantaged by mandatory-arbitration arrangements. See David Sherwyn et al., In
Defense of Mandatory Arbitration of Employment Disputes: Saving the Baby, Tossing Out
the Bath Water, and Constructing a New Sink in the Process, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 73,
139-46 (1999). If the employer disadvantage argument is correct, employers are unaware of
their disadvantage. They are the moving parties in formulating the agreements. They
defend them when they are attacked in judicial proceedings. See, e.g., EEOC v. Waffle
House, Inc. 534 U.S. 279, 281-82 n.* (2002) (listing three briefs filed by amici curiae in
support of employer Waffle House); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 108-
09 n.* (2001) (listing nine briefs by amici curiae filed on behalf of employer Circuit City).
Employers work actively in opposition to legislation that would end or limit mandatory
arbitration. See Overview of Contractual Mandatory Binding Arbitration: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Admin. Oversight and the Courts of the Comm. on the Judiciary of the
U.S. Senate, 106th Cong. 62 (2000) (statement of Lawrence Z. Lorber, U.S. Chamber of
Commerce) available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/oldsite/31200011.htm (last visited Oct.
13, 2003). But see Cole, Uniform Arbitration, supra note 45, at 777 n.63 (suggesting that
some employers are turning away from mandatory arbitration because increasingly rigorous
due process requirements are taking away the advantages conferred by mandatory
arbitration).
84. See Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d. 646, 657-65 (6th Cir. 2003)
(finding cost-splitting provision in mandatory-arbitration agreement not enforceable).
85. Id.
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86clause is unenforceable. No lower court decision could strike down an
arrangement for compensation of the mandatory arbitrator on the ground
that the employer paid the entire arbitrator's fee. To do so would be in
direct conflict with Gilmer. Also, some post-Gilmer mandatory-arbitration
issues treated by lower courts were not before the Supreme Court in
Gilmer. For example, the question of whether employees covered by
mandatory-arbitration agreements can be compelled to pay a share of the
87mandatory arbitrator's fee has split lower circuit courts. Mr. Gilmer's
employer paid the entire arbitrator's fee, thus removing the issue of shared
arbitrator fees from the Court's consideration.
B. Commentators
Not surprisingly, the Gilmer decision produced large amounts of
academic and other commentary. Most of it was at first critical of the
decision.8  In addition, the federal Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission criticized the decision.8 9 This was an unusual pronouncement
from an agency created to play a key role in the administration of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 and subsequently enacted employment discrimination
statutes. The National Academy of Arbitrators, an organization whose
members would derive economic benefit from the implementation of
mandatory-arbitration agreements covering employment disputes, also
criticized the decision. 90
The original wave of critics drew criticism from commentators who
86. E.g., Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 685-89 (Cal.
2000); Mercuro v. Superior Court, 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d 671 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (deciding that
unconscionable mandatory-arbitration agreements are not enforceable).
87. See Shankle v. B-G Maint. Mgmt. of Colo., Inc., 163 F.3d 1230, 1234-35 (10th Cir.
1999) (agreement not enforceable because it required employee to pay a shared fee he could
not afford); Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (agreement not
enforceable, but only to the extent that it required a shared-fee arrangement); Armendariz, 6
P.3d at 689 (agreement not enforceable because it required a shared-fee arrangement). But
cf. Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 170 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1999)
(shared fee affordable therefore fee clause enforceable).
88. See, e.g., Alleyne, supra note 7; Feller, supra note 7; Grodin, supra note 7.
89. See EEOC, Policy Statement on Mandatory Binding Arbitration of Employment
Discrimination Disputes as a Condition of Employment, EEOC Notice 915.002 (July 10,
1997), at http://www.eeoc.gov/docs/mandarb.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2003); Nancy
Montweiler, EEOC: Commission Policy Guidance Reaffirming Long Opposition to
Mandatory Arbitration, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), No. 133, at AA-I (July 11, 1997).
90. See STATEMENT AND GUIDELINES (Nat'l Acad. of Arbitrators 1997), at
http://www.ilr.cornell.edu/alliance/resources/Guide/statement-guidelines-ofNAA.htm
(last visited Oct. 28, 2003) ("The National Academy of Arbitrators opposes mandatory
employment arbitration as a condition of employment when it requires waiver of direct
access to either a judicial or administrative forum for the pursuit of statutory rights.")
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argued that Gilmer was correctly decided. 9' The critics focus on the
various procedural problems inherent in the mandatory-arbitration setting.
Apart from the re-user issue, not many of them comment on a connection
between the manner in which arbitrators are compensated and the fairness
of mandatory arbitration in statutory-claim contexts. Few do more than
92accept the Court's analysis of Congressional intent.
1. The Commentator Critics
Central to critical commentary on Gilmer is discussion of the Court's
never-explained shift, over a seventeen-year span, from criticism to
acceptance of arbitration as a forum for the resolution of statutory claims. 93
The Gilmer Court merely noted that "generalized attacks on arbitration
'res[t] on suspicion of arbitration as a method of weakening the protections
afforded in the substantive law to would-be complainants,' and as such,
they are 'far out of step with our current strong endorsement of the federal
statutes favoring this method of resolving disputes."' 94 The opinion does
not say why its new view of arbitration should prevail over that expressed
in the Court's Gardner-Denver line of cases, holding that completion of
labor arbitration involving a parallel statutory claim does not bar future
judicial trial of the statutory claim.9
As the term "mandatory arbitration" connotes, there is ordinarily no
negotiation over mandatory-arbitration terms as there are in voluntary
agreements to arbitrate. Ordinarily, parties to arbitrated disputes
91. See, e.g., Samuel Estreicher, Predispute Agreements To Arbitrate Statutory Claims,
72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1344 (1997); St. Antoine, Changing Role, supra note 24. But see
Richard A. Bales, Creating and Challenging Compulsory Arbitration Agreements, 13 LAB.
LAW. 511 (1998); Susan A. FitzGibbon, Reflections on Gilmer and Cole, 1 EMPL. RTS. &
EMP. POL. J. 221 (1997); Michael Z. Green, Debunking the Myth of Employer Advantage
from Using Mandatory Arbitration for Discrimination Claims, 31 RUTGERS L. J. 399 (2000);
Macey, supra note 63.
92. In earlier writings, I have casually alluded to the appearance-of-partiality issue. See
Reginald Alleyne, Assessing Mandatory Arbitration: A Response to Professor St. Antoine,
ADR CURRENTS, Mar. 1998, at 5, 17 n.10 and accompanying text.
93. In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974), the Court held that an
employee who lost a contractual racial discrimination grievance in labor arbitration was not
precluded from pursuing a statutory racial discrimination claim in federal court. The
rationale for the decision was based in part on the relative inadequacy of labor arbitration
and labor arbitrators in statutory-claim cases, as distinguished from collective-bargaining-
agreement claims. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 56-58; see also Barrentine v. Arkansas-
Best Freight Sys. Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 743 (1981) (holding similarly, except that the involved
statute was the minimum wage provision of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§
201-19).
94. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 30 (1991) (quoting
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 481 (1989)).
95. Supra note 93.
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voluntarily agree to arbitrate and voluntarily agree to the terms of their
arbitration agreements, including selection of the arbitrator and the manner
of compensating the arbitrator.96 For mandatory-arbitration agreements, the
employee, in order to work or remain employed, must "take-it [the
mandatory-arbitration clause] -or-leave-it."
97
Commentator criticism includes the absence of effective discovery,"
employers' superior familiarity with the cadre of arbitrators who decide
statutory employment law claims-the "repeat player" syndrome,99 denial
of the right to a jury trialj 0 larger awards from juries than from
arbitrators.' ' Another criticism of Gilmer centers on the private nature of
the arbitration forum and, as a result, the inhibition on the development of aS •• 102
body of public law through published decisions.
96. BASIC PArTERNS, supra note 8, at 37-39.
97. The Court could certainly have relied on the well-settled view that adhesion
contracts are generally enforceable, perhaps on the now pragmatic ground that they have
become part and parcel of commercial life in the United States. For example, new computer
programs may not be installed unless the user clicks on the "Accept" box. See discussion
supra note 38. Adhesion contracts like these are, as one commentator has noted,
"ubiquitous in modem commercial life, but their proper legal treatment remains in doubt."
See Rakoff, supra note 14, at 1174 (appearing in the prefacing summary paragraph by the
law review editors).
98. David M. Kinnecome, Note, Where Procedure Meets Substance: Are Arbitral
Procedures a Method of Weakening the Substantive Protections Afforded by Employment
Rights Statutes?, 79 B.U. L. REV. 745, 767-68 (1999).
99. Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, 1 EMPLOYEE
RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 189, 212-15 (1997) [hereinafter Bingham, Effect].
100. Stemlight, Mandatory Binding Arbitration, supra note 7, at 695-710.
101. See Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 690 (Cal.
2000) ("[V]arious studies show that arbitration is advantageous to employers not only
because it reduces the costs of litigation, but also because it reduces the size of the award
that an employee is likely to get, particularly if the employer is a 'repeat player' in the
arbitration system."); see also William M. Howard, Arbitrating Claims of Employment
Discrimination: What Really Does Happen? What Really Should Happen?, Disp. RESOL. J.
Oct.-Dec. 1995, at 40, 42-43 (comparing jury trial and employment arbitration findings of
liability and damages awards, and concluding that employees have a 30% higher success
rate in jury trials and higher damages awards).
102. Only a small percentage of labor arbitration decisions is published in a source that is
available to the public. The Labor Arbitration Report, a service published by the Bureau of
National Affairs, contains a selection of significant labor arbitration decisions from around
the nation. There is no equivalent source of publication for voluntary employment
arbitration decisions and mandatory-arbitration decisions. In Gilmer, the Supreme Court
appeared to confuse publication of an award with publication of an opinion, the former
being required by the governing N.Y. Stock Exchange rules, but not the latter. Virtually all
arbitration proceedings are privately conducted. See Adriaan Lanni, Case Note, Protecting
Public Rights in Private Arbitration, 107 YALE L.J. 1157, 1160 (1998) (criticizing Cole for
ignoring "an element crucial to a fair arbitration process: public access to arbitration
awards."). Lanni explains that mandatory arbitrations "display two of the four
characteristics cited by Owen Fiss as inappropriate for private resolution: 'significant
distributional inequalities' between the parties and 'a genuine social need for an
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2. The Counter-Critics
Professor Samuel Estreicher succinctly summarizes the case for
Gilmer proponents:
Private arbitration will never, and should not, entirely supplant
agency or court adjudication. But if properly designed, private
arbitration can complement public enforcement and, at the same
time, satisfy the public interest objectives of the various statutes
governing the employment relationship.
°0 3
Professor Estreicher, reflecting the general view of Gilmer supporters,
takes as a premise the well-founded assumption that arbitration has many
advantages over judicial litigation: it is less expensive, faster, more
informal,' °4 and better geared to the kinds of small statutory claims that
lawyers might be reluctant to take through the expensive processes of
judicial litigation. In his view and those of other Gilmer proponents, all of
these advantages will inure to the benefit of parties to the process and the
public, if mandatory-arbitration processes are "properly designed."
Estreicher counters Gilmer critics who assert inequality of bargaining
power in the formation of mandatory-arbitration agreements. He suggests
that job applicants can make the choice between mandatory-arbitration
employers and non-mandatory-arbitration employers. At the same time, he
concedes the obvious: "Where all employers in a given industry require
predispute arbitration agreements as a condition of employment, the
authoritative interpretation of law."' Id. at 1161 n.25 (discussing Owen M. Fiss, Against
Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1087 (1984)).
103. Estreicher, supra note 91, at 1349.
104. Chief Judge Harry T. Edwards, U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit, a former labor arbitrator and a much respected labor law scholar, has a decidedly
different view. See Harry T. Edwards, Where Are We Heading with Mandatory Arbitration
of Statutory Claims in Employment? 16 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 293 (1999) [hereinafter
Edwards, Where Are We Heading?]. Chief Judge Edwards bluntly states:
I also think that some courts still subscribe to the fond, but misguided, view that
employment arbitration is invariably quick and cheap. The simple truth is it just
ain't necessarily so. When we researched the subject in connection with the
appeal in Cole, we found that the [American Arbitration Association] cited $700
per day as the average arbitrator's fee. JAMS/Endispute arbitrators charged an
average of $400 per hour, but fees of $500 or $600 per hour were not
uncommon.
Id. at 306-07 (footnotes omitted). The difference between the then $700 per day fee and the
$400-$600 per hour fee reflects more than different organizations setting different fee
structures, as a reader unfamiliar with arbitrator fee structuring might surmise on reading
Chief Judge Edwards' statement. The $700 per day figure is an average fee in labor
arbitration cases, where unions and employers voluntarily arbitrate and voluntarily agree on
the selection of the arbitrator and to share the arbitrator's fee. The $400-$600 per hour fee
is unheard of in labor arbitration cases. Rather, these fees are charged by arbitrators in
mandatory-arbitration cases.
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employee's practical ability to shop for employers that will not require
arbitration is substantially diminished."' 05 Estreicher conspicuously avoids
the words "mandatory arbitration." He substitutes for them the term "pre-
dispute agreements." The substitution appears to be more than a mere
semantical choice. It reflects Gilmer's casual-indeed, almost
nonexistent-treatment of mandatory arbitration's compulsory qualities
and how radically different they make a process that has always featured
the voluntary agreement as its core attribute. This is demonstrated by
Estreicher's manner of treating "voluntariness." He states that "a
'voluntariness' test injects an additional element of uncertainty-on top of
the doubts under existing law over whether these agreements are binding."
He adds that "[t]his additional layer of uncertainty will have the effect of
discouraging such agreements. '0 6 Estreicher's rationale takes the premise
that mandatory-arbitration agreements are not voluntarily entered into,
reconstructs the premise as an abstract uncertainty, and then discards it
because of the purported uncertainty. Thus reconstructed, the premise no
longer stands in the way of a conclusion that the involuntary nature of
mandatory-arbitration agreements may be a partial basis on which to
conclude that mandatory-arbitration agreements are unenforceable.
Professor Estreicher raises the question of "whether improvements in
benefits could be exchanged for agreements to submit future disputes to
arbitration."'' 0 7  The invalid assumption inherent in the question is that
mandatory-arbitration agreements are preceded by negotiations over their
terms. Generally, there are no such negotiations, and it seems fanciful to
assume otherwise. The absence of an employee's opportunity to negotiate
the agreement's terms, coupled with their job-contingent nature, makes
mandatory-arbitration agreements indisputably involuntary.
Another commentator, Professor Theodore St. Antoine, acknowledges
the arguments of Gilmer opponents and, in large part, concedes their
validity. But he also sees "another side to the story."' 8 He cites crowded
EEOC and court dockets, the lengthy time it takes to obtain a jury trial, and
105. Estreicher, supra note 91, at 1354 n.30.
106. Id. at 1358. The substitution of euphemisms for "mandatory arbitration" appears to
be a favorite tactic of Gilmer proponents. See, e.g., Dennis R. Nolan, Employment
Arbitration After Circuit City, 41 BRANDEIS L.J 853 (2003). The article supports the Gilmer
decision without ever using the words "mandatory arbitration." The term "employment
arbitration" is substituted for "mandatory arbitration," thus making voluntary and
involuntary arbitration indistinguishable. The Ninth Circuit, for example, is described in the
article as "ideologically and idiosyncratically anti-arbitration," rather than "anti-mandatory
arbitration." Id. at 865. Consistent with this approach, the Nolan article does not inform the
reader that the signing of a mandatory arbitration agreement is generally an exacted
condition of employment, as illustrated in EEOC v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton, & Scripps,
303 F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 2002).
107. Id.
108. St. Antoine, Changing Role, supra note 24, at 91.
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the high likelihood of cases being dismissed before trial.'09 He emphasizes
that, in the employment law context, plaintiffs' attorneys turn down a high
percentage of individuals seeking their assistance, and that mandatory
arbitration provides a forum for those claims that would otherwise not be
heard in any forum, because they are too small to attract lawyers who will
take them to court.1 °0 St. Antoine concedes that the same lawyers who
decline to take small-claim employment cases to court will also sometimes
decline to take them to arbitration, thus leaving the mandatory-arbitration
claimant without representation "in this much less formal and intimidating
[arbitration] forum."'' .
St. Antoine also cites what he describes as empirical evidence that
plaintiffs in employment cases win more often in the arbitration forum than
they do in the judicial forum." 2 However, his analysis is based on a mix of
cases that leaves his conclusion open to question. The cited studies
compare employment arbitration cases, both statutory and non-statutory,
and labor arbitration cases with all statutory employment claims cases filed
in court."' For arbitrated employment termination claims not based on
109. Id. at 92. The premise that plaintiffs face formidable hurdles in their efforts to
pursue statutory discrimination claims in court cannot be challenged. See Jess Bravin, U.S.
Courts Are Tough on Job-Bias Suits, WALL ST. J., July 16, 2001, at A2 (citing Eisenberg &
Schwab report on how discrimination plaintiffs fare on appeal, as compared with other kinds
of claims); Theodore Eisenberg & Stuart J. Schwab, Double Standard on Appeal: An
Empirical Analysis of Employment Discrimination Cases in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, July
16, 2001 (report commissioned by Mehri & Skalet, PLLC), at http://www.findjustice.com
/ms/pdf/double-standard.PDF (last visited Oct. 28, 2003). Through my experiences and
conversations with other arbitrators with employment arbitration experience, I have
recognized that unlike labor arbitration, many employment mandatory arbitration
proceedings use the array of motions, including motions for summary judgment, that are
available in federal court proceedings. Thus, a claim that is not likely to survive a
defendant's motion for summary judgment in a federal judicial proceeding will likely not
survive a similar motion made in an arbitration proceeding.
110. St. Antoine, Changing Role, supra note 24, at 92.
111. Id. at 91.
112. Id. at 92 n.55 and accompanying text. Professor St. Antoine's empirical argument
draws heavily on Lewis L. Maltby, Private Justice: Employment Arbitration and Civil
Rights, 30 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 29 (1998). It is likely that a failure to distinguish
between statutory and non-statutory claims in arbitration accompanies a failure to
distinguish between voluntary and mandatory arbitration. Maltby's cited studies
demonstrate that employees have a favorable view of voluntary arbitration and an
unfavorable view of mandatory arbitration. In the conclusion of his article, Maltby states:
"Arbitration should never be a condition of employment." Id. at 64.
113. See Lanni, supra note 102, at 1162 n.36 and accompanying text (criticizing the
empirical literature for not distinguishing between statutory and non-statutory claims). The
cited studies are valuable contributions to employment law literature. I have no criticism of
them, except to whatever extent they suggest a premise in support of mandatory arbitration.
With the exception of the Maltby article, the cited studies do not purport to reach
conclusions concerning the fairness of mandatory arbitration. Maltby, supra note 112.
Professor St. Antoine's premise, drawn from the studies, is that "mounting empirical
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discrimination covered by statute, the claimant need only prove that the
termination was arbitrary in some way. For the statutory discrimination
claim filed in court, a plaintiff will not prevail, even if the termination was
arbitrary, so long as it was not for discriminatory reasons made unlawful by
statute. 14 For example, the discipline-termination standard in collective-
bargaining agreements is a "just-cause" standard. The labor arbitrator, in
order to find for the union, need only determine that the employer acted
arbitrarily.' 1 5  Typically, failure to note these kinds of distinctions
contributes to a widely held impression that all of the positive attributes of
procedurally fair arbitration processes-labor arbitration, for example-are
also attributes of mandatory arbitration for statutory claims. Manifestly,
they are not. Other studies find that employees do not do as well before
evidence indicates most [individual claimants] will fare less well [in court] than they would
before a qualified arbitrator," and that "[s]everal studies show that employees actually win
more often in arbitration than in court .. " St. Antoine, Changing Role, supra note 24, at
92 n.55 and accompanying text. His arguments are repeated in Theodore J. St. Antoine,
Gilmer in the Collective Bargaining Context, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. REsOL. 491, 500-01
(2001). Professor St. Antoine's cited "mounting empirical evidence" is drawn from
Maltby's reliance on studies conducted by others. Most grievances taken to labor arbitration
under collective-bargaining agreements cover mainly non-statutory subjects over which
courts generally have no jurisdiction because they have no statutory or common law source:
discharge and discipline without just cause; premium pay, lunch, rest and cleanup; holiday
pay, layoff, rehiring and work sharing; bumping, personal leave, union leave, and funeral
leave; seniority as it governs promotion, posting of vacancies, transfer, no-strike clauses, no-
lockout clauses, hiring-hall, dues check-off, wages, including cost of living, wage reopeners,
and supplementary pay; worker safety and health. See BASIC PATTERNS, supra note 8, at
vii-xi (Table of Contents). It is a mismatched comparison, for example, to compare wins
and losses in arbitration grievances over discharge cases having no basis as a discrimination
claim of any kind, with a court-filed statutory race- or sex-based termination claim. A labor
arbitration grievant before a labor arbitrator interpreting a just cause clause in a collective-
bargaining agreement can win by showing a termination for arbitrary reasons; a plaintiff
attempting to prove unlawful discrimination under a federal statute, for example, must
prove, as an essential element of his or her claim, a discharge motivated by the
discrimination prohibited by statute. Certainly, as compared with the difficulty of winning a
discrimination case, it is easier for an employee to win a dispute over whether a disciplinary
warning for being ten minutes late should be removed from the employee's record.
114. "The factfinder may not focus on the soundness of the employer's business
judgment, since the ADEA was only intended 'to protect the older worker from arbitrary
classification on the basis of age.' The ADEA did not change the fact that an employer may
make a subjective judgment to discharge an employee for any reason that is not
discriminatory." Wilkins v. Eaton Corporation, 790 F.2d 515, 521 (6th Cir. 1986) (internal
citations omitted).
115. Other studies reach the conclusion that employers win more cases in arbitration than
they do at trial and that damages against employers are less in arbitration than they are at
trial. Stone, Yellow Dog, supra note 7, at 1040 n.162 (citing Stuart Bompey & Michael
Pappas, Compulsory Arbitration in Employment Discrimination Claims: The Impact of
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 1993 A.B.A. SEC. ON EMPLOYMENT & LAB. LAW
EEO COMM. PAPERS).
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arbitrators as they do in court, both as to liability and damages issues.'
1 16
In support of mandatory arbitration, St. Antoine cites the avoidance of
juries "likely to render volatile verdicts,"' 17 meaning verdicts awarding
plaintiffs what he would presumably regard as excessively high damages. 18
The argument can be turned around and used to support the position of
Gilmer's critics: what Gilmer proponents describe as the jury-avoidance
advantage may not be the irrational verdict that a trial judge could
overturn,"19 but rather the high-damages plaintiff s verdict that is within the
range of permitted jury discretion and hence not capable of being
overturned."O Employers likely perceive that arbitrators are less inclined to
award damages that juries could return without being reversed by the trial
judge or by an appeals court, because the verdicts were within the range of
the jury's discretion. Constitutional and statutory rights to jury trials are
qualified by judicial control over jury verdicts.''
Neither Professor St. Antoine nor Professor Estreicher discusses
whether Congress intended to permit the enforcement of mandatory-
arbitration agreements covering federal statutory claims. Like the Gilmer
Court, they avoid the key arguments that make their perceptions of the
beneficial consequences of mandatory arbitration largely irrelevant. When
Congress enacted statutes prohibiting discrimination, it was presumably
aware, for example, that some small statutory discrimination claimants
would be unable to attract lawyers to represent them; that as an offset, large
jury awards in statutory-claim cases would increase employer incentives to
116. PUBLIC CITIZEN, supra note 10, at 68 (concluding and citing data indicating that
"arbitrators simply do not render awards as high as do judges and juries."). See Reilly,
supra note 4, at 1211 nn.32-35 and accompanying text (citing polls indicating a "nearly
sixty percent win rate for plaintiffs [in court]" but a thirty percent win rate for plaintiffs in
arbitration cases involving discrimination). Reilly reports that "[t]he mean damages
awarded by arbitrators from 1993 to 1995 was $49,030 compared to $530,611 by district
courts," id. at 1211-12 n.37 and accompanying text, and that "arbitrators rarely award
punitive damages" in contrast to the median punitive damages award of $2,689,033 in
employment cases from 1985-1994. Id. at 1212 & nn.37-44
117. St. Antoine, Changing Role, supra note 24 at 98-99 (citing jury awards of "$20
million, $4.7 million, $3.25 million, $2.75 million, $2 million, $1.5 million, $1.19 million,
and $1 million.").
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. See FED. R. Civ. P. 50(b) (empowering a federal district judge to overturn a jury
verdict). Decisions have long interpreted the rule to mean that a judge may overturn a jury
verdict, or take away from the jury the opportunity to render a decision that no reasonable
jury would render. See Neely v. Martin K. Eby Construction Co., Inc., 386 U.S. 317, 321
(1967); Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 389-90 (1943). On reconciling the right to
ajury trial with ajudge's ability to overturn ajury verdict, see JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL.,
supra note 21, § 12.3.
121. JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 21, § 12.3. See Gasperini v. Center for
Humanities. Inc., 518 U.S. 415 (1996).
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comply with the statutes.
IV. ARBITRATORS' FEES
A. The Influence of Cole v. Bums International Security Services
Not until Cole v. Burns International Security Services' did a court
take up the issue of shared arbitrators' fees in mandatory-arbitration
proceedings. Neither party in the case addressed the arbitrator-
compensation issue. 123 On its own, the Cole court determined that an
employee relegated to mandatory arbitration could not be contractually
required to pay a share of the arbitrator's fee, there being no similar
requirement in a judicial proceeding. 24 As a remedy, the court interpreted
the arbitration agreement's silence on arbitrator compensation as an
employer-pays-all arbitrator compensation arrangement. 125 The remainder
of the mandatory-arbitration clause was held to be enforceable. The
question of whether the employee resisting arbitration could afford to pay a
one-half share of the arbitrator's fee was not considered. The decision may
be read to take the approach that the shared-fee arbitrator compensation
arrangement is per se unenforceable and that no arbitration case litigant
should suffer when neither the decision to arbitrate nor the determination of
how and by whom the arbitrator should be compensated is voluntarily
reached.
Then Chief Judge Edwards's opinion in Cole has all the hallmarks of a
judge who disagrees with, but must conform to, a binding higher court's
decision. At length, his decision cites problems with the enforcement of
mandatory-arbitration agreements. 126 This is followed by the
acknowledgement, introduced by a connecting "Nonetheless," that the
122. 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
123. See Cole, 105 F.3d 1465, 1489 (LeCraft Henderson, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (noting that the issue of fees and costs was "posed by the panel sua
sponte during oral argument"). Since Cole, the shared-fee issue has been raised in other
cases. Federal circuit courts are now divided on the question. See Morrison v. Circuit City
Stores, 317 F.3d. 646, 657-65 (6th Cir. 2003) (finding that cost-splitting provision in
mandatory-arbitration agreement not enforceable).
124. Cole, 105 F.3d at 1484 ("Indeed, we are unaware of any situation in American
jurisprudence in which a beneficiary of a federal statute has been required to pay for the
services of the judge assigned to hear her or his case.")
125. Id. at 1484-85.
126. Id. at 1472-79. In particular, Edwards points out that "mandatory arbitration
agreements in individual employees' contracts often are presented on a take-it-or-leave-it
basis; there is no union to negotiate the terms of the arbitration agreement. Thus, employers
are free to structure arbitration in ways that may systematically disadvantage employees."
Id. at 1476.
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Supreme Court had announced another view in the Gilmer case. In
published articles Judge Edwards has emphasized distinctions between the
arbitration of private and public disputes.17  For disputes involving the
interpretation of statutes, he has expressed skepticism about the utility of
arbitration and arbitrators.12  He has also bluntly identified a judicial-
caseload motive for judicial decisions holding the mandatory-arbitration
process to be an appropriate means of resolving statutory disputes. 12 In his
most recent article on mandatory arbitration, Judge Edwards flatly
concludes that he is still uncertain about the utility of mandatory
arbitration. 30
Social norms of privacy concerning arbitrators' compensation may at
least partially explain why the linkage of mandatory arbitrators' fees and
the fairness of mandatory-arbitration proceedings have so seldom been
argued. Professional fees are generally avoided as topics of social
discourse.' In many job contexts, it is widely regarded as indiscreet to
raise inquiries for which answers might reveal how much money other
individuals earn, particularly in occupations-arbitration among them-
where income variations hinge on an indeterminate combination of
experience, reputation, and skill. Labor arbitrators, for example, may have
known per diem rates, but very few labor arbitrators are positioned to know
127. See generally Harry T. Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or
Anathema?, 99 HARV. L. REV. 668 (1986).
128. See Harry T. Edwards, Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Cases: An
Empirical Study, 28 NAT'L ACAD. ARB. 71-72 (1975) (comparing the percentage of
arbitrators who read court cases involving Title VII of the Civil Rights Act with the
percentage of arbitrators who feel "professionally competent" to decide statutory
employment discrimination issues).
129. See Edwards, Where Are We Heading?, supra note 104, at 306 (noting caseload
motive).
130. Id. at 299 ("With all due respect, it appears that, in retrospect, the Supreme Court
may have overestimated the virtues of arbitration in Gilmer."). The dissenting opinion in
Cole criticizes the court's opinion for its criticism of Gilmer:
Of more significance, owing to its impropriety, is the majority's statement that
'it is perhaps misguided to mourn the Supreme Court's endorsement of the
arbitration of complex and important public law claims.' It is more than
misguided-it is wrong. We are not in the business of lamenting or celebrating
decisions of the United States Supreme Court. We are to follow them. Period.
Cole, 105 F.3d at 1489 n.l (Henderson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(internal citation omitted).
131. For example,
Most people, however, prefer that their incomes not be revealed ... Why is this
privacy so important? In some cases, we may feel that we are not making as
much as we should, and we prefer not to make others know of our
shortcomings. In other cases, we may fear that people will become envious or
angry if they learn the size of our incomes.
ANDREw HACKER, MONEY: WHO HAS How MUCH AND WHY 28 (1997).
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other arbitrators' billable days per year.'32
B. Prohibitive and Potentially Prohibitive Costs
The prevailing view that arbitration litigation 33 costs less than judicial
litigation is under attack-and for sound reasons.134 Even when arbitration
litigation costs less than judicial litigation, the timing of some required
arbitration costs, such as upfront fees for the arbitrator, can make it likely
that the arbitration-plaintiff will be unable to proceed in that forum. 35
When arbitration filing and forum fees are added to the arbitrator's fees,
arbitration can cost more, so much more that a claimant can be discouraged
from using arbitration when it is voluntary. When this happens in
mandatory-arbitration settings, the mandatory-arbitration clause bars the
plaintiff from the judicial forum and arbitration costs bar the plaintiff from
132. Labor arbitrators' fees have been topics of discussion at meetings of the National
Academy of Arbitrators. See Hensler, supra note 41, at 134-35; Picher et al., supra note 13,
at 260-62. Support for the stated conclusion that arbitrators tend not to reveal their income
to other arbitrators is based on the author's over twenty-five years of attending various
meetings of the National Academy of Arbitrators and other kinds of organizations with large
numbers of arbitrators as members, many of whom are close friends and acquaintances.
133. I use the term "arbitration litigation" as a counter to the sometimes held view that
arbitration, like mediation, is an alternative to litigation, even though the prevailing
arbitration process involves direct examination and cross-examination of witnesses, opening
arguments, closing arguments and, unlike judicial litigation, goes further in the direction of
formality by permitting parties to file post-hearing briefs for the arbitrator to consider before
making a decision. See generally MARTIN DOMKE, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (1965)
(exploring the arbitration process). Based upon the author's conversations with numerous
employment arbitrators and parties involved in voluntary employment arbitration, the
governing procedural rules are sometimes the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
134. See generally PUBLIC CITIZEN, supra note 10.
135. In a malpractice case against a law firm, the arbitrator denied the defendant law
firm's motion for summary judgment but then conditioned going forward with the
arbitration on payment of additional arbitration fees by the parties. The arbitrator wrote:
I have concluded that the parties are best served by a determination of the
merits as to Claimant's claims. This is provided, of course, the parties "pay for"
this administration of justice. It is regrettable perhaps, but the AAA [American
Arbitration Association] and its arbitrators do not provide their services for free.
As a condition then of continuing this arbitration proceeding, Claimant must
pay all sums due [to] the AAA forthwith. Additionally, the parties must commit
to deposit with the AAA an additional $3750. That sum is calculated at nine
hours of arbitration time six hours of pre- and post arbitration activity ... at my
discounted fee of $250 per hour.
If the previously owing sums, plus half of the deposit are not paid by
Claimant to the AAA by May 12, 2000, this matter will be dismissed with
prejudice for the reasons stated in Respondent's brief.
Letter from Eliot G. Disner to John S. West and Gerald P. Cunningham (April 21, 2000),
quoted in PUBLIC CITIZEN, supra note 10, at 14-15.
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the arbitration forum. It follows that when statutory claims are involved in
a mandatory-arbitration process, a plaintiff with a judicial forum prescribed
by the legislature can unwillingly end up with no forum.
Employment arbitrators who are attorneys, including those who serve
as arbitrators in mandatory-arbitration proceedings involving statutory
claims, tend to set their fees at the same, or close to the same, level of the
fees they charge clients for legal services. The fees are generally based on
hourly rates ranging from $200 to $400. 136 Virtually no labor arbitrator sets
hourly-rate fees in a labor arbitration case."' Their per diem rates are
generally much lower than employment arbitrators' hourly rates, when
converted to per diem rates.13  However, when labor arbitrators serve as
employment arbitrators, including mandatory-arbitration employment
disputes, they also command compensation by the hour. In addition to
paying arbitrators' fees, parties who use the services of the American
Arbitration Association (AAA) for the administration of their dispute must
pay an "Initial Administrative Fee" of $175.139 Until November 1, 2002,
AAA rules for employment disputes, including mandatory-arbitration cases
required the employee to pay several different kinds of fees: a filing fee of
$125; 140 a postponement/cancellation fee of up to $120; and administrative
fees ranging from $500 to $13,000, depending upon the size of the
employee's claim. 41 All of these upfront fees are nonrefundable. 142 In an
implicit but major acknowledgment of problems concerning the cost of
mandatory arbitration for individual employees, effective November 1,
2002, these rules were amended to require employers to pay all
administrative and filing fees and all of the arbitrators' fees in mandatory-
arbitration cases. 143 The AAA has announced that the new rules making the
136. Id. at 14. See Letter from Elaine McLaughlin to R. Gerald Barris (Aug. 8, 2000), in
id. at 22-23.
137. See LABOR ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 55. The unnumbered section in the
rules, following Rule 46, is entitled "Administrative Fees." Under the sub-title, "Arbitrator
Compensation," it provides: "Unless mutually agreed otherwise, the arbitrator's
compensation shall be borne equally by the parties, in accordance with the fee structure
disclosed in the arbitrator's biographical profile submitted to the parties."
138. See Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1480 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
139. LABOR ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 55, at "Administrative Fees".
140. RULES FOR EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES, supra note 55, at "Administrative Fee
Schedule".
141. Id.
142. Id. But see Estreicher & Ballard, supra note 10, at 10 (challenging existence of any
negative impact from upfront mandatory-arbitration fees).
143. Mandatory-arbitration cases are described in the Amended Rule as "employer-
promulgated plans." RULES FOR EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, supra note 55. The
unnumbered section entitled "Administrative Fee Schedule" provides that "[ulnless the
employee chooses to pay a portion of the arbitrator's compensation, such compensation
shall be paid in total by the employer." Id. The immediately preceding sentence provides
that "[a]rbitrator compensation is not included in this schedule" of administrative fees, even
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employer responsible for the arbitrator's entire fee were promulgated by
"recent case law developments."' 44
Arbitrator fees, routinely paid by the employer alone, are virtually
unknown in both labor arbitration 145 and voluntary employment arbitration
of statutory disputes.146  Grievance-arbitration clauses in collective-
bargaining agreements almost always provide that the union and employer
will share the mutually selected arbitrator's self-determined fees. 147  A
labor arbitrator's fee typically will include a per diem rate set by the
arbitrator, encompassing both hearing and decision-writing days.1 48  A
labor arbitrator's fees also include accrued travel time, transportation costs,
and fees for cancellations or postponements of scheduled arbitration
hearing dates. Union labor arbitration costs, including fees of union
counsel, are, like most union expenditures, paid for from funds collected
from union members' dues payments. The employee-grievant pays no
arbitrator fees or any other costs associated with the arbitration.
Arbitrator appointing agencies, like the Federal Mediation and
Conciliation Service and the American Arbitration Association, provide
labor arbitration parties with lists of arbitrators from which they can
mutually agree on a procedure for choosing one of the listed arbitrators.
149
Biographical data on each arbitrator is provided, including a statement of
the arbitrator's per diem fee. 50 Collective-bargaining agreements typically
provide that the union and employer will mutually select the arbitrator and
will mutually compensate the arbitrator for the time spent hearing and
deciding a case at what is now an average per diem rate of $720.75 per
day.' 5' Decision-writing time includes the time spent studying the record
though the next sentence relates to the subject of arbitrator compensation. Id. The
euphemism "employer-promulgated plan" is distinguished from an earlier provision in the
rules, entitled "Designing an ADR Program," that includes "pre-dispute, mandatory, final
and binding arbitration" in a list of programs "which use arbitration as a final step." Id.
144. Employment Rules Modified: Fairness for Employees in Arbitration is AAA Goal,
Disp. RESOL. TIMES, Oct.-Dec. 2002, at 1 [hereinafter Employment Rules Modified]. The
change was also likely influenced by the Public Citizen report on the cost of arbitration.
PUBLIC CITIZEN, supra note 10.
145. Some collective-bargaining agreements require that the party who loses the
arbitration pay the arbitrator's entire fee. See BASIC PATTERNS, supra note 8, at 39.
146. ELKOURI & ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 24-25, 186 (Marlin M. Volz &
Edward P. Goggins eds., 5th ed. 1997).
147. See BASIC PATTERNS, supra note 8, at 39 (noting that 92% of collective-bargaining
agreements sampled mention arbitration expenses and 91% of these provisions provide for
equally shared arbitrator fee).
148. ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 146, at 24-25.
149. See LABOR ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 55, R. 12 & 14.
150. Id. at "Administrative Fees: Arbitrator Compensation"; 55 FED. MEDIATION AND
CONCILIATION SERV. ANN. REP. 31 (2002), available at http://admin.fmcs.gov/assets/files
/annual%20reports/FY2002AnnualReport.doc (last visited Oct. 28, 2003).
151. FED. MEDIATION AND CONCILIATION SERV., id.at 31.
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made in the case."' Currently, the average ratio of a labor arbitrator's
study-and-writing-time to hearing time is nearly two to one. Thus, on
average, a labor arbitrator who hears a case for one day will bill the parties
for three days at the arbitrator's per diem rate. The labor arbitrator's
average bill for such a labor arbitration case is $2100.'" Labor arbitration
per diem fees that are shared by the employer and the union range from
$500 to $1000 per day. 54  Employees compelled to arbitrate under
mandatory-arbitration agreements thus must often bear arbitrator-fee costs
that far exceed what a union party would pay for the representation of a
bargaining-unit employee. In addition to sharing the arbitrators' fees at
$200 to $400 per hour, employees in mandatory-arbitration cases are
compelled to pay arbitration filing fees of $500, plus a share of forum fees
ranging from $1500 to $3000155 including one recorded forum fee of
$82,000. 156 Upfront payment of forum and arbitrators' fees under
mandatory-arbitration clauses may provide an inherent disincentive to use
the arbitration process for fear that it will be unaffordable, even if it should
turn out not to be.
The mandatory arbitrator shared-fee structure does more than set fees
at a rate some employees are unable to afford. It also provides a counter to
the argument that mandatory arbitration provides for employees with small
statutory claims a forum they would otherwise not have, because of the
small size of their claims. 57 If a statutory claim is too small to attract a
lawyer willing to represent the claimant, the claim may be too small to
make it worthwhile to arbitrate, to pay a share of an arbitrator's fee, and
any upfront forum fees a provider of arbitration services might require.
The following hypothetical is illustrative:
In a mandatory-arbitration setting, an employee has a $500 Social
152. Id.
153. Id. If a labor arbitration case is postponed or cancelled before a hearing, the
arbitrator may be paid for all scheduled hearing days if the cancellation takes place within
the cancellation period established by the arbitrator. Typically, labor arbitrator cancellation
periods for fee purposes are between two weeks and thirty days.
154. Id.
155. Mandatory Arbitration Agreements in Employment Contracts in the Securities
Industry: Hearing Before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs,
105th Cong. 8 (1998) (statement of Rep. Edward J. Markey, Member, Senate Banking
Committee). See generally PUBLIC CITIZEN, supra note 10.
156. See Sobol v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., Inc., 49 F. Supp. 2d 208, 224 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)
(noting that, in Wolfe v. Schwab, NYSE Arb. Docket No. 1993-003197, at
http://scan.cch.com/aad/199408/1993-003197.pdf (Aug. 19, 1994) (last visited Oct. 28,
2003), the "claimant pursued an unsuccessful sex discrimination allegation and was assessed
one-half of $82,800 in forum fees for 55 hearing sessions and one discovery conference.").
In the Sobol case, plaintiff alleged sex and age discrimination and was assessed $25,650 in
mandatory-arbitration forum fees. Id. at 213. Her motion to vacate the fees was denied. Id.
at 224.
157. St. Antoine, Changing Role, supra note 24. at 92.
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Security Act claim. After a six-hour hearing and four hours of decision-
writing time, the arbitrator awards the employee $500. The arbitrator's fee
for hearing and deciding the case is $4000, based on ten hours of work at
$400 per hour. Under a shared-fee billing arrangement, the arbitrator bills
the employer and the employee $2000 each. This would be a net loss of
$1500 for the employee. The Gilmer-proponent position on individuals
with small statutory claims merely shifts a small-claim plaintiff's judicial-
forum problem to an equally serious arbitration-forum problem of a
different character. Foreseeing this kind of result, a plaintiff would likely
abandon arbitration and be left with no remedy, not even a possible small-
claims court remedy.
Until the Cole15 8 case was decided, plaintiffs who resisted motions to
dismiss and to compel mandatory arbitration had not attacked fee-sharing
clauses. Nor has the employment plaintiffs' bar attacked the alternative
means of compensating the arbitrator, with fees paid entirely by the
employer. From the perspective of its members, the shared fee is perhaps
regarded as the more acceptable fee-arrangement alternative, because it
avoids the potential for arbitrator bias that is appropriately associated with
the unilaterally employer-paid fee. Plaintiffs can at least sometimes afford
the shared mandatory-arbitration fee. The unilaterally employer-paid fee
almost invariably generates an appearance of partiality. Yet, until the Cole
decision, the employment plaintiffs' bar appears to have accepted both the
mandatory shared-arbitrator fee and the mandatory unilaterally employer-
paid arbitrator fee. Though the post-Cole approach has generated attacks
on the shared mandatory fee, 15 9 challenges to the unilaterally employer-paid
arbitrator fee remain rare if not nonexistent.
If and when a mandatory-arbitration plaintiff challenges the shared
arbitrator fee and the employer-paid arbitrator fee as an unacceptable
alternative, the Supreme Court may have to decide whether a mandatory-
arbitration agreement is enforceable when either arbitrator compensation
procedure is part of the mandatory-arbitration agreement.' The response
158. 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
159. See Shankle v. B-G Maint. Mgmt. of Colo., Inc., 163 F.3d 1230, 1234-35 (10th Cir.
1999) (rendering agreement not enforceable because it required employee to pay a shared
fee that he could not afford); Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1483-86 (D.C.
Cir. 1997) (finding agreement not enforceable, but only to the extent that it required a
shared-fee arrangement); Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669,
689 (Cal. 2000) (rendering agreement not enforceable because it required a shared-fee
arrangement). But see Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 170 F.3d
1 (1st Cir. 1999) (noting that because the shared fee was affordable, the fee clause was
enforceable).
160. The now hypothetical case could arise in several different contexts: (1) a plaintiff's
challenge to a mandatory-arbitration, shared-fee arrangement in which the shared-fee is
directly attacked on the rationale of the Cole case, and the Cole-case type remedy of
converting the shared-fee clause to an employer-paid-fee clause is also attacked on the
ARBITRATORS' FEES
of substituting a unilaterally employer-paid fee for the shared mandatory-
arbitration fee, as at least one major provider of arbitration services has
done, 16 may be a leap from the frying pan of shared arbitrator fees to thefire of the employer-paid fee and its generated ethical issues.
V. APPEARANCE OF PARTIALITY
A. The Judiciary
John Adams, the second president of the United States, was admitted
to the Massachusetts Bar in 1759. The justice of the peace before whom he
argued his first case was the father of the lawyer he opposed. 162 No lawyer
at that time could have challenged a judge on the ground of a blood
relationship between opposing lawyer and judge. Recusal motions for
judicial bias were unknown at common law in England, 16'3 and none would
exist in federal courts until 1911. 64  Judge-litigant relationships were
tolerated on the probable rationale that a judge could put the relationship
aside and fairly decide a case. There was no standard of appearance of
partiality, and none would exist in federal courts until 1974.165 Eighteenth-
century American judges were perceived to be experts in the law who
would always apply it in the only available correct manner, even when the
judge was the father, other relative or close friend of a lawyer representing
one of the litigants. The prevailing outlook of the time was that a judge
knew what the law was or knew where to find it in the law books; that
having found it, or having learned it so well that no search for it was
required, the judge would apply the law in the single certain way it ought to
be applied.
Federal and state court judges are today bound by Codes of Judicial
Conduct requiring disqualification when their impartiality might reasonably
appearance-of-partiality rationale suggested in this article; (2) plaintiffs challenge to a
mandatory-arbitration clause requiring a unilaterally employer-paid arbitration fee, and
attacking, as well, using Cole-case rationale, any remedy substituting a shared fee for an
employer-paid fee; and (3) plaintiffs' challenges to both kinds of arbitrator-compensation
agreements in separate cases.
161. See Employment Rules Modified, supra note 144, at 1, 18 (noting that the AAA is
taking steps to reduce arbitration costs for employees).
162. DAVID MCCULLOUGH, JOHN ADAMS 44-45 (2001).
163. See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 543 (1994) ("[R]equired judicial recusal
for bias did not exist in England at the time of Blackstone.").
164. The original statute, now in its current form, is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 144
(Historical and Revision Notes following § 144).
165. In 1974 Congress amended the Judicial Code to require a judge's disqualification in
any proceeding "in which [the judge's ] impartiality might reasonably be questioned." 28
U.S.C. § 455; see Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847 (1988).
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be questioned. 116 The standard has been almost uniformly interpreted to be
an objective standard that prohibits even an appearance of partiality.
167
Judges are generally obliged to recuse themselves when the standard is
breached. The requirement that an impartial judge preside over judicial
proceedings has been elevated to a constitutionally protected status,
grounded in the importance of maintaining public confidence in judicial
proceedings.
68
The obligation to recuse has been found to include judicial remarks on
or off the bench,169 presiding over a prior related 170 or unrelated case,"'
presiding over former clients' or former opponents' cases, family, social or
business relationships, and personal connection with the proceedings.7 2 If
a party to a civil case paid a judge to decide the case, criminal proceedings
for bribery would be likely if the payment were covert. Recusal would be
nearly automatic and never tolerated in the unimaginable overt case. A
criminal conviction violates constitutional due process if a small part of the
presiding judge's income consists of court fees collected from convicted
defendants.'73 If it is unconstitutional for a judge to be compensated by
166. The American Bar Association's Model Code of Judicial Conduct has been adopted
in some form in forty-nine states. Leslie W. Abramson, Appearances of Impropriety:
Deciding When a Judge's Impartiality "Might Reasonably Be Questioned," 14 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 55, 55 (2000). Canon 1 of the 1990 Code provides that "[a]n independent
and honorable judiciary is indispensable to justice in our society." MODEL CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon I(A) (1990). Canon 2 of the 1990 Code imposes on judges a
duty to "avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of the judge's
activities." Id. Canon 2; see also Abramson, supra, at 56 & nn.2-3 (2000). A challenged
judge is presumed to be qualified and impartial, thus casting upon the moving party seeking
recusal the burden of proving that the judge could not be impartial. Id. at 70.
167. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 114 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
168. See Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 60 (1972) (noting that a
defendant who is tried before a biased judge is deprived of Fourteenth Amendment rights).
169. See Abramson, supra note 166, at 76 n.102, and accompanying text (indicating a
number of cases in which side comments by judges have led to a finding of bias); Charles
Lane, High Court to Consider Pledge in Schools: Scalia Recuses Himself from California
Case, WASH. POST, Oct. 15, 2003, at Al (noting that Justice Scalia recused himself after
motion for recusal had been filed objecting to comments made by the justice at a public rally
in Fredericksburg, Va.).
170. Abramson, supra note 166, at 76.
171. See Pride v. Harris, 882 P.2d 381, 385 (Alaska 1994) (noting that prejudgment of a
party in an unrelated case could possibly require recusal); James v. People, 727 P.2d 850,
857 (Colo. 1986) (admitting possibility that prejudice displayed against party in an unrelated
case can be grounds for recusal).
172. See Abramson, supra note 166 at 86 n.148 (noting that judge's personal reactions in
court can be grounds for recusal); Charles Lane, Stevens Gives Rare Glimpse of High
Court's "Conference, " WASH. POST, Oct. 19, 2003, at A3 (detailing speech given by Justice
Stevens in which he justified decision not to recuse himself in case involving former law
clerk).
173. See Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 535 (1927) (noting that when a defendant is
before a judge with conflicting interests, there has necessarily been a denial of due process).
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defendants in criminal cases, it is unethical at best, and unlawful at worst,
for an arbitrator to be compensated exclusively by one party to a statutory-
claim dispute before the arbitrator. The unilaterally paid arbitrator
compensation that Gilmer permits is a breach of Gilmer's announced
judicial-parity principle that a switch to arbitration for resolution of a
statutory claim is no more than a transfer of forum.
B. The Arbitration Forum
Mandatory-arbitration arbitrators who decide statutory claims are
bound by more than the substantive law of the statutes they interpret.
Arbitrators are bound by "elementary requirements of impartiality taken for
granted in every judicial proceeding ... when the parties agree to resolve a
dispute through arbitration,"' 174 and the arbitrator is obliged to "avoid even
the appearance of bias. ' 75 When labor arbitrators resolve disputes between
unions and employers, they are also bound by a self-policing Code of
Professional Responsibility. It requires that labor arbitrators avoid the
appearance of partiality. 76  If an appearance-of-impartiality standard
174. Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 146-47 (1968). In
Commonwealth Coatings a neutral arbitrator on a tri-partite panel had been a paid consultant
for one of the parties to the arbitration. The Court determined that the award issued by the
panel should be vacated as required by the Federal Arbitration Act's "evident partiality"
standard. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2000). Canon 2 of the Model Code for Judicial Conduct sets the
standard for appearance of partiality by mandating that a "judge shall avoid impropriety and
the appearance of impropriety in all of the judge's activities." MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT Canon 2 (1990) (emphasis added). The commentary to Canon 2 discusses the
importance of public confidence in the judiciary and how public confidence is eroded by the
mere appearance of a judge's partiality. Id. at Canon 2(A) cmt.
175. Commonwealth Coatings, 393 U.S. at 150.
176. A Code of Professional Responsibility binds labor arbitrators who are members of
the National Academy of Arbitrators (NAA). See CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, supra
note 66. Three entities involved in the arbitrator selection process are signatories to the
NAA's Code, one private and two public: The American Arbitration Association (AAA),
the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS), and the National Mediation Board
(NMB). Even though the Code is applicable to NAA members only, it effectively covers
many non-member labor arbitrators. Many labor arbitrators receive arbitration assignments
as a result of being chosen from a list of arbitrators provided by private or public appointing
agencies, like the AAA, FMCS, and the NMB. Each appointing agency is empowered to
apply the Code's standards in determining who is eligible to be and to remain on the rosters
of arbitrators used to provide parties with names of arbitrators. Section 2.B.3 of the NAA
Code provides as follows:
An Arbitrator must not permit personal relationships to affect decision-making.
Prior to acceptance of an appointment, an arbitrator must disclose to the parties
or to the administrative agency involved any close personal relationship or other
circumstance, in addition to those specifically mentioned earlier in this section,
which might reasonably raise a question as to the arbitrator's impartiality.
CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 66, at § 2.B.3 (emphasis added); see also NAA
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governs both commercial and labor arbitration proceedings in their
voluntary contexts, in cases usually not involving statutory claims, at least
the same or perhaps greater scrutiny ought to be generated in statutory-
claim, mandatory-arbitration proceedings.
Gilmer professes that the employee remanded to arbitration under an
adhesive arbitration agreement has merely substituted forums, with no loss
of substantive rights. A major flaw in the premise is that the mandatory-
arbitration procedures that control arbitrator compensation make the
arbitration forum very much unlike a judicial forum, where no plaintiff
would ever face a similar kind of appearance-of-partiality problem. If a
judge who is paid from defendants' fines conveys an appearance of
favoring the prosecution for income-supplementing purposes, 7 7 the
unilaterally paid arbitrator in a mandatory-arbitration statutory-claim case
conveys the appearance of bias in favor of the employer who pays the
arbitrator's entire fee under the employer's own unilaterally imposed rules.
Commentators also have suggested the existence of a repeat player
syndrome: employer knowledge about the pool of available arbitrators is
superior to that of employees and some arbitrators will know this and take
it into account in deciding cases, particularly when the employer pays the
arbitrator's entire fee.17 8  On the assumption that all arbitrators are
sufficiently honorable to avoid being so influenced, any debate over actual
arbitrator bias, as generated by a purported repeat player syndrome in
statutory-claim cases, need not be resolved. The relevant question is
whether the unilaterally-compensated arbitrator procedure generates the
appearance of a repeat player syndrome. The syndrome aside, would a
reasonable observer view the unilaterally-compensated arbitrator, known to
be working pursuant to a unilaterally structured arbitration agreement, as
one who appears to have ruled for the employer-with future arbitration
Comm'n on Prof 1 Responsibility and Grievances, Formal Op. 9 (1981) in GRUENBERG ET
AL., supra note 66, at 371, 386-87 app. D (interpreting § 2.B.3 to require an arbitrator to
disclose that his wife had contracted to act as library consultant for the law firm representing
the employer in a case before him).
The words "might reasonably raise a question as to the arbitrator's impartiality"
parallel those in the statute governing disqualification of federal judges, requiring that a
judge "disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be
questioned." 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). It is settled that under the quoted federal statute, "what
matters is not the reality of bias or prejudice but its appearance." Liteky v. United States,
510 U.S. 540, 548 (1994).
177. See Tumey, 273 U.S. at 535 (noting that when a defendant is before a judge with
conflicting interests, there has necessarily been a denial of due process).
178. See Bingham, Effect, supra note 99, at 190-91 (discussing the notion that
employers, as repeat players in arbitration, will be systematically advantaged); Tia
Schneider Denenberg & R.V. Denenberg, The Future of The Workplace Dispute Resolver,
Disp. RESOL. J., June 1994, at 48, 50 (noting that the employer's experience with arbitration
affords an advantage in future arbitrations).
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assignments in mind? Inescapably, the answer would seem to be yes.
Apart from repeat player syndrome, an observer of mandatory
arbitration might reasonably view the arbitrator's unilaterally paid
compensation as at least some consideration for a decision in favor of the
employer. Arbitrators themselves have expressed concern that unilaterally
paid arbitrator fees can compromise the arbitration process. 79 This is
likely less so, but still so, when the parties to a mandatory-arbitration
proceeding mutually select the arbitrator.
In an effort to achieve consensus on the procedural requirements for a
fair mandatory-arbitration proceeding, two respected and influential groups
in the mid-1990's drafted non-binding procedural guidelines for statutory,
mandatory-arbitration proceedings. The Dunlop Report, commissioned by
the federal government, recommends as part of a package of fair procedural
guidelines, "cost-sharing between the employer and the employee to ensure
arbitrator neutrality."'' 0 The ABA's Due Process Protocol makes similar
recommendations regarding fee sharing.'
8'
Despite the relevance of the appearance issue in mandatory-arbitration
proceedings, courts and commentators tend to limit discussion of arbitrator
bias issues to actual bias. For example, in Cole v. Burns International
Security Services, 1 2 after holding a mandatory-arbitration, shared-fee
clause unenforceable, the court discussed the alternative of the employer
paying the entire arbitrator's fee. This reflected the court's understandable
sensitivity to the then well-understood view that the shared-fee avoided
arbitrator neutrality problems associated with the unilaterally employer-
paid mandatory arbitrator fee. The court thus felt compelled to defend the
employer-paid fee, having struck down the governing shared-fee clause. It
took up the arbitrator-neutrality issue, but without extending the analysis to
its appearance component. Then Chief Judge Edwards wrote, "[i]t is
doubtful that arbitrators care about who pays them, so long as they are paid
for their services.' 83
It may be assumed that Chief Judge Edwards' statement provides an
answer to the question: is an arbitrator who is paid entirely by one party to
a mandatory-arbitration proceeding likely to suffer actual bias as a result?
One may further assume, for argument's sake, that the answer to that
question is no; that arbitrators, as stated in the Cole case, do not care who
179. See Picher et al., supra note 13, at 260-62.
180. COMM'N ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MGMT. RELATIONS, U.S. DEP'TS OF
COMMERCE & LABOR, FINAL REPORT 57 (1994) (Dunlop Commission), at
http://www.ilr.comell.edu/library/downloads/keyWorkplaceDocuments/DunlopCommission
FutureWorkerManagementFinalReport.pdf (last visited Oct. 28, 2003).
181. See DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL, supra note 83, at § C(6) ("Impartiality is best assured
by the parties sharing the fees and expenses of the mediator and arbitrator.").
182. 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
183. Id. at 1485.
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pays them so long as someone pays them, meaning they suffer no actual
bias by virtue of being paid solely by the employer. The court's statement
may be taken as an accurate description of arbitrators' subjective views on
arbitrator compensation sources. It has no bearing on the objective-
standard consideration of "whether a reasonable and informed observer
would question the [arbitrator's] impartiality."'
'
1
4
Some academic commentary on mandatory arbitration similarly
employs the subjective-standard of actual bias in lieu of an objective-
standard analysis. Professor St. Antoine, for example, in viewing the
positive side of mandatory arbitration, argues that "[o]ne has to count
primarily on the inherent integrity of the great body of arbitrators-and on
their knowledge that recognition of that integrity in the labor-management
community is indispensable for their capacity to practice"."' If, however,
"inherent integrity" were a sufficient response to a claim of appearance of
impropriety, there would be no appearance-of-partiality standard. Counsel
would have to rely on the judge's "inherent integrity", even if the judge
were lead counsel's parent or spouse.116
VI. THE PROCEDURAL CHOICE ADVANTAGE
Gilmer noted that the securities industry procedures "provide
protections against biased [arbitration] panels.' 87 The cited "protections"
were entitlement to the employment histories of the arbitrators, the exercise
of one peremptory challenge, unlimited challenges for cause, required
disclosures of conflicts of interest by the panel arbitrators, and the right to
challenge the arbitrator's award in court on a showing of "evident partiality
184. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 114 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (discussing
federal statute which requires disqualification of judge only when judge's impartiality might
reasonably be questioned); Int'l Ins. Co. v. Schrager, 593 So. 2d 1196, 1197 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1992). In Schrager, an employer invoked "appearance of neutrality" as a problem for
a unilaterally paid arbitrator compensation arrangement, in seeking to gain acceptance for a
shared-fee arbitrator compensation arrangement. The court resolved the issue of actual
arbitrator bias, citing Cole, but said nothing about the appearance-of-bias issue raised by the
employer. See Shankle v. B-G Maint. Mgmt. of Colo., Inc., 163 F.3d 1230, 1235 (10th Cir.
1999) (dismissing a suggestion of actual bias when the mandatory arbitrator is unilaterally
paid by the employer, without addressing the issue of appearance of bias).
185. St. Antoine, Changing Role, supra note 24, at 89 n.45. The statement appears to
assume that the arbitrators who hear mandatory-arbitration cases are mainly labor
arbitrators, a doubtful assumption. See David Sherwyn et al., supra note 83, at 121 n.262
(citing GAO study indicating arbitrators lack of training in labor law). The distinction is
important. The advocate-attomeys who make up the bulk of arbitrators in mandatory-
arbitration cases do not "practice" arbitration, so much as they practice law.
186. See, e.g., Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 817 (1986) (finding a due
process violation when an Alabama Supreme Court judge cast deciding vote at the same
time that he was litigating, as a plaintiff, a parallel issue in lower court).
187. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 30 (1991).
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or corruption in the arbitrators." 181 It was of no procedural concern to the
Court that the employer both picked and paid the arbitrator. The cited New
York Stock Exchange rules could scarcely be useful in ferreting out actual
arbitrator bias. It is hardly possible to find evidence of actual bias by
reading an arbitrator's employment history. A single peremptory challenge
to an arbitration panel composed solely of employer-selected arbitrators
simply reduces the number of employer-selected arbitrators on the panel.
Proving the "evident partiality or corruption" of a unilaterally selected
arbitration panel member is a near impossibility and, indeed, is rarely an
issue in any arbitration proceeding.
Apart from the issue of whether certain unilaterally promulgated
arbitration rules are per se so unfair as to void the arbitration proceedings,
mandatory arbitration provides for employers the advantage of crafting
even objectively fair rules to their advantage. They can decide unilaterally,
for example, whether hearing proceedings will be recorded, whether briefs
will be filed, and in what time frame, and where the arbitration will be held.
Their rules can also dictate the scope of discovery. By comparison, federal
judicial forum rules, for example, are created pursuant to an act of
Congress that confers on the Supreme Court the authority to write the
federal rules of civil procedure for federal trial courts. 8 9
The current trend in judicial decisions and academic commentary is to
validate the enforcement of mandatory-arbitration clauses if the associated
arbitration procedures meet minimum "due process" standards.' 90 This
means that mandatory-arbitration procedural rules will fail only if,
individually or in the aggregate, they are so one sided as to provide a
blatant employer advantage. This is why rules governing dispute resolution
proceedings are ordinarily mutually crafted by involved parties, as they are
for labor arbitration proceedings, or they are crafted by non-parties with the
public's general interests in mind, as are the procedural rules governing
trials in federal and state courts.19'
The unilaterally imposed rules governing mandatory-arbitration
proceedings are most often in place when the employee elects to sign a
mandatory-arbitration agreement rather than lose a job or a job opportunity.
Typically, mandatory-arbitration agreements do not spell out the
procedures that will govern the imposed arbitration proceedings. Rather,
they bind employees to whatever procedures the employer has created or
will later create.' 92 Both classes of procedural rules-those that meet and
188. Id. at 30-31 (citing 9 U.S.C. § 10(b)).
189. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2000); see Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934,
130 U. PA. L. REv. 1015 (1982) (providing a history of the statute).
190. DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL, supra note 83.
191. Supra note 189.
192. See supra notes 11-12.
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those that do not meet minimal due process standards-may well influence
the substantive outcome of a statutory-claim dispute in a mandatory-
arbitration forum. They differ only in the degree to which they might have
a bearing on substantive outcome.
Procedural rules are either party-neutral or designed to protect the
interests of plaintiffs or defendants. For example, notice requirements' 93
strongly favor defendants' interests. Plaintiffs' interests are favored by the
rule that certain defenses, such as improper venue and lack of jurisdiction
over the person, are waived unless raised by motion or in pleadings. 94
Procedural rules governing summary judgment are facially neutral.195 Yet
they really favor defendants, who need only show the presence of a genuine
issue as to a material fact with respect to any single element of a multi-
element claim, while plaintiffs must demonstrate the absence of fact issues
with respect to each element of its claim. The rules governing post-verdict
motions are party-neutral. One party's ability to control the rulemaking
process confers on that party the opportunity to allocate unilaterally the mix
of employer-advantage, employee-advantage, and party-neutral rules.
Indeed, a party possessing that authority may confine its rulemaking
authority to promulgation of employer-advantage rules, none of which may
objectively be viewed as in violation of "due process" norms. Indeed, a
function of the employer defendants' bar is to design unilaterally for
employer clients the rules governing mandatory-arbitration proceedings.'96
VII. THE UNARTICULATED CASELOADS PREMISE
A. Judicial Caseloads
Federal judges have long had a reputation for working hard. Any
caseload-reduction motives they harbor may appropriately be grounded in a
desire to devote more effective time to smaller numbers of cases or, at
least, to make their caseloads more manageable. The problem with an
unarticulated premise like caseload reduction is that it might provide the
governing rationale for a decision which, without the unarticulated premise,
might have been decided another way. Was the Gilmer decision
substantially motivated at least in part by caseloads considerations? All
indicators point to an affirmative answer.197 Judicial caseloads are
193. E.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 4 (service of process and notice to the opposing party).
194. E.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 12(g)-(h) (waiver of defenses).
195. E.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 56 (motions for summary judgment).
196. See generally Estreicher & Ballard, supra note 10 (describing how, as counsel for
employers, they recommend how mandatory-arbitration agreements should be structured).
197. See Charles J. Coleman & Gerald C. Coleman, Toward a New Paradigm of Labor
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enormously high and growing. Arbitration has long been regarded as a
possible remedy for high judicial caseloads.'9g The temptation to downplay
differences between mandatory and voluntary arbitration in accepting
mandatory arbitration as a remedy for the judicial caseloads problem had to
have been overwhelming given the nature of the caseloads problem and the
subtlety with which mandatory and voluntary arbitration distinctions can be
understated, as they were in the Gilmer decision.
When the Gilmer case was decided in 1991, the caseloads of federal
judges had burgeoned to what has been described as a "crisis" level.1 99
Caseloads of federal district court judges, federal circuit court judges, and
the Supreme Court had increased, respectively, by approximately 250, 700,
and 115 percent.2°° They have continued to rise since the Gilmer decision
in 1991,20' and it appears that the rise in caseloads has not been
202proportionately matched by increases in the number of federal judges.
The problem is not easily solved. Adding additional judges, though an
effective remedy at the trial level, can actually be counterproductive at the
intermediate level of United States Courts of Appeals, for example. As
Judge Posner has written, "beyond a certain point there are too many
judges to deliberate effectively. 2 °3 He wrote that the judicial caseloads
Arbitration in the Federal Courts, 13 HOFSTRA LAB. L. J. 1, 66 (1995) (suggesting that the
Gilmer decision resulted from desire to control caseloads of U.S. courts).
198. See Warren E. Burger, Isn't There a Better Way?, 68 A.B.A. J. 274, 276-77 (1982)
(discussing importance of arbitration as an alternative to the court system); Rehnquist, supra
note 71, at 2 (discussing advantages of arbitration).
199. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRisis AND REFORM (1985);
Thomas E. Baker & Denis J. Hauptly, Taking Another Measure of the "Crisis of Volume" in
the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 51 WASH. & LEEL. REV. 97 (1994).
200. Arthur D. Hellman, Courting Disaster, 39 STAN. L. REV. 297, 299 (1986) (book
review). As the quoted caseload percentage rise demonstrates, the most critical problem
was the rise in the caseloads of U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals judges. See Baker & Hauptly,
supra note 199, at 97 (discussing the dramatic increase in the federal appellate caseload).
201. Federal judicial caseloads have been rising steadily since 1940. See Burger, supra
note 198, at 275 ("From 1940 to 1981 annual federal district court civil case filings
increased from about 35,000 to 180,000.... From 1950 to 1981 annual court of appeals
filings climbed from over 2,800 to more than 26,000.").
202. Cf. Hellman, supra note 200, at 305-06 (discussing the option of increasing the
number of federal appellate judges to deal with the increased caseload).
203. Posner, supra note 199, at 9. Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes opposed
President Franklin D. Roosevelt's plan to enlarge the Supreme Court. Responding to the
President's use of a supposed backlog of Supreme Court cases as a basis for the plan, the
Chief Justice responded:
1. The Supreme Court is fully abreast of its work....
7. An increase in the number of Justices of the Supreme Court... would not
promote the efficiency of the Court. It is believed that it would impair that
efficiency so long as the Court acts as a unit. There would be more judges to
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crisis in 1985 was of a magnitude that defied solution, except by reducing
the number of cases entering federal trial courts. In his view, that would
not be accomplished by structural or procedural reform but by rethinking
jurisdictional and substantive doctrine, much of which would "clearly
implicate ideological and political concerns. ' ' °  The two areas of
substantive law he would cut back from the federal case docket are federal
statutory and constitutional civil rights claims and federal habeas corpus
claims challenging state court convictions on federal statutory or
constitutional grounds. Judge Posner, never shy about expressing
controversial views on many areas of the law, °5 articulated a judicial-
caseloads position that may fairly be presumed to be the unarticulated view
of many other judges. If judges are willing to shape procedural and
jurisdictional law with judicial caseloads in mind, they would likely shape
law on the enforcement of mandatory-arbitration agreements-with judicial
caseloads in mind.
B. Arbitration as a Judicial Caseload Remedy
In a landmark speech before the American Bar Association in 1982,
Chief Justice Warren Burger said "[o]ne reason our courts have become
overburdened is that Americans are increasingly turning to the courts for
relief from a range of personal distresses and anxieties. '20 6 Much of his
speech promoted what he viewed as the caseload overload remedy of "a
system of voluntary arbitration , ' 2°7 and with good reason. If widespread
acceptance of voluntary arbitration was substituted for judicial case filings,
judicial caseloads would certainly be reduced dramatically. Chief Justice
William H. Rehnquist, like his immediate predecessor, Chief Justice
Burger, has also expressed an interest in partially substituting arbitration
for the judicial forum. In 1977, then-Associate Justice Rehnquist cited "the
increasing load on courts at all levels in state and federal judicial systems"
as a reason for the improved prospects of the "increased use of arbitration
as a means of settlement of disputes .... ,,208 Both Chief Justices spoke of
hear, more judges to confer, more judges to discuss, more judges to be
convinced and to decide.
Letter from Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes to Senator Burton K. Wheeler (Mar. 21,
1937), S. REP. No. 75-711, at 38-40 (1937).
204. Hellman, supra note 200, at 311.
205. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, AN AFFAIR OF STATE: THE INVESTIGATION,
IMPEACHMENT, AND TRIAL OF PRESIDENT CLINTON 4 n. 10, 54-55 (1999) (arguing that there
was enough evidence to warrant Clinton's indictment-providing an example of a federal
judge prejudging the merits of a possible future federal criminal trial).
206. Burger, supra note 198, at 275.
207. Id. at 277 (emphasis added).
208. Rehnquist, supra note 71, at 2.
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voluntary arbitration-Chief Justice Burger explicitly, Rehnquist by
implication.
Though Chief Justice Burger did not explicitly state that increases in
federal legislation providing individual rights were a factor contributing to
rising federal judicial caseloads, that was implicit in his reference to a
society more able to use the courts. Voluntary arbitration was then and
remains now a potentially effective judicial caseload overload remedy. But
voluntary arbitration means a consensual agreement to arbitrate. Not many
Americans, in 1982, would have been willing to take a large damages claim
to an arbitrator rather than a jury. Literature on public attitudes toward
arbitration is scant. Arbitration is still an esoteric subject for many
Americans, some of whom are hard pressed to offer a distinction between
arbitration and mediation. However, it is perhaps telling that in
overwhelming numbers, individuals with claims in federal court prefer jury
trials to non-jury trials.2° It is doubtful that in 1982 many parties to a
judicial statutory-claim proceeding in federal court would have consented
to substitute arbitration for the right to a judicial trial. The goal of
substituting voluntary arbitration for significant numbers of judicial
proceedings could not have been accomplished without overcoming the
daunting problem of how to make the arbitration of statutory claims more
acceptable to potential courtroom plaintiffs. For employment disputes, at
least, employers developed mandatory-arbitration agreements. Their
enforcement via Gilmer converted a process that had long been associated
with volition to one simply imposed by an adhesion contract. The volition
element thus posed a dilemma for proponents of arbitration as a remedy for
excessive judicial caseload. That dilemma was very likely overcome, at
least in part, by simply ignoring arbitration's history of volition. Judges
would hardly be prone to admit that judicial caseloads influenced a
decision. But one federal judge, at least, has been quite candid about it:
One might ask why, in the light of some of the difficulties found
with arbitration of statutory claims, some courts are still singing
the praises of the arbitral forum. One reason is self-interest.
Many judges are relieved not to be burdened by a docket
consisting of a high volume of cases founded on employment
disputes. These are often tedious cases, involving angry parties
and mostly fact-bound disagreements. It is not the kind of
210litigation that most judges prefer to manage.
One court, in the course of overturning an arbitrator's award, took the
caseload motive out of the realm of the unarticulated premise. It cited
"reduction of the caseload of the federal courts" as one of the objectives to
209. Office of Admin. of the U.S. Courts, Judicial Facts and Figures tbl.2.13 (2003), at
http://www.uscourts.gov/judicialfactsfigures/contents.html.
210. See Edwards, Where Are We Heading?, supra note 104, at 306.
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be achieved in limiting judicial review of arbitrators' decisions.21" ' While
confessed judicial caseload motives are rare, the fact that any exist is
revealing. The encouragement of voluntary arbitration as a remedy for
judicial caseloads problems and the absence of convincing rationale for the
Gilmer result make a fair case that Gilmer was motivated mainly by
judicial caseloads considerations.2 2
C. Mandatory Arbitration Satellite Litigation
Developing law on the enforceability of mandatory-arbitration
agreements is now moving in the direction of fashioning guidelines for
determining the procedural fairness of particular mandatory-arbitration
213agreements and proceedings. The American Arbitration Association, a
prominent provider of arbitration services, has recently changed its rules to
provide "additional safeguards for employees involved in the [mandatory-]
arbitration process."' 14  The Supreme Court has determined that an
employee may not be compelled to use a prohibitively expensive
mandatory-arbitration proceeding." 5 These developments have opened a
potentially vast area for costly and time-consuming satellite litigation at the
discovery stage. It will supplement the already growing area of satellite
litigation on the enforceability of mandatory-arbitration agreements
covering statutory claims. It will thus become satellite litigation over
satellite litigation.
Approval of satellite litigation on affordability issues means that the
affordability issues must be resolved on a case-by-case basis. This will
place a heavy and sometimes impossible burden on some plaintiffs. Given
the settled arbitration practice of billing for both hearing time and decision-
211. See Stead Motors of Walnut Creek v. Auto. Machinists Lodge No. 1173, 843 F.2d
357, 359 (9th Cir. 1988).
212. A caseloads motive for Gilmer is often assumed in non-academic literature. E.g.,
Ashlea Ebeling, Better Safe Than Sorry, FORBES MAG., Nov. 30, 1998, at 162 ("The basic
idea [of mandatory arbitration] was a good one: Arbitrating employment disputes would
help unclog the court system.").
213. See Cole, Uniform Arbitration, supra note 45, at 766 (discussing the focus of
reform efforts addressing mandatory arbitration after Gilmer).
214. Employment Rules Modified, supra note 144, at 1; see also AAA Reduces
Arbitration Costs to be Paid by Employees, Disp. RESOL. J., Nov. 2002-Jan. 2003, at 5
(noting that the administrative fee for employees has a $125 cap).
215. See Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 92 (2000) (holding that a
plaintiff seeking to invalidate an arbitration agreement on the ground that it is prohibitively
expensive bears the burden of proving such expense). The decision might be read to
overrule lower court decisions upholding shared-fee arrangements in mandatory-arbitration
agreements. But the mandatory-arbitration agreement in the case was silent on arbitration
fees, as the Court noted and considered in determining that the plaintiffs concerns about
arbitration costs were prematurely registered. Id. at 90-92. The question presented in Cole
was not decided.
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writing time, arbitrators' fees are not easily gauged in advance. To
determine in advance the size of an arbitrator's bill would require both
advance knowledge of how long it will take the arbitrator to hear the case
and how long it will take the arbitrator to decide the case and write a
decision. It would be impossible to determine in advance how often a
hearing date might be rescheduled, triggering the cancellation and
postponement fees that are a staple of arbitration practice. Institutional
parties can bear these uncertainties and the ultimate costs. Individual
employees going against their employers may not be able to do so.
Further compounding the problem for plaintiffs, the mandatory
arbitration affordability issue is subject to discovery by an employee
plaintiff seeking to meet its burden of proof on the "prohibitively
expensive" standard.21 6 The obvious irony is that discovery is often the
most expensive stage of litigation.1 7 Inevitably, some plaintiffs will spend
enough money on affordability discovery so as to make arbitrators' fees
and other arbitration costs ultimately unaffordable. 21 Those plaintiffs who
succeed in demonstrating in a judicial forum their inability to afford
mandatory arbitration would then face the prospect of judicial-forum
litigation with their resources having been reduced by the expenditures
required to prove arbitration unaffordable. Rather than face such a
prospect, many potential plaintiffs will never become statutory-claim
plaintiffs. Others having claims will be forced to abandon them. Could
Congress have so intended?
VIII. CONGRESSIONAL INTENT
A. Enforcement of Mandatory-Arbitration Agreements
The Gilmer decision concluded that "Gilmer has not met his burden of
showing that Congress, in enacting the ADEA, intended to preclude
arbitration of claims under that Act.' 2 9 The Court also noted the absence
of inhibiting language "deducible from [the ADEA's] text or legislative
216. See Blair v. Scott Specialty Gases, 283 F.3d 595, 610 (3rd Cir. 2002) (reversing the
district court's dismissal of the plaintiffs claims and remanding for additional discovery to
determine whether arbitration was prohibitively expensive).
217. See Letter from Judge Paul V. Niemeyer, Chair, Advisory Committee on Civil
Rules, to Judge Alicemarie H. Stotler, Chair, Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure (June 30, 1998), in Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and Evidence, 181 F.R.D. 18, 25-26 (1998).
218. See generally John S. Beckerman, Confronting Civil Discovery's Fatal Flaws, 84
MINN. L. REv. 505 (2000) (discussing the problematic aspects of civil discovery practice).
219. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 35 (1991).
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history. ,220 Having not addressed the ethical implications of appearing
before a decision-maker paid by one's opposition, the Court was unable to
conclude, as it should have, that the burden of demonstrating Congressional
intent to permit that unusual consequence had shifted to the employer. The
Court did not consider the basic question of whether the FAA's use of the
word "arbitration" meant voluntary arbitration, and no more, which would
have been consistent with arbitration's history and usage up to the time of
the FAA's adoption.
The legislative history of the ADEA is silent on the topic of enforcing
agreements to arbitrate ADEA claims. But there is a reason for the silence.
Congress could not have intended the enactment of the ADEA to apply to
mandatory arbitration, because mandatory arbitration for the resolution of
statutory claims did not exist until the securities industry invented it long
after the FAA, the ADEA, and other employment-rights statutes were
enacted.22' The demonstrably bizarre consequences generated by
mandatory-arbitration agreements covering statutory claims are such that
congressional silence should have been taken to mean that Congress could
222not have intended their enforcement. Only positive approval by
Congress could justify their judicial enforcement. This would be true even
if Congress had never expressed its views on the voluntary nature of
arbitration-but it has.
B. Court-Annexed Arbitration
Congress' treatment of court-annexed arbitration for the voluntary
arbitration of statutory disputes is further evidence that Congress could not
have intended the judicial enforcement of mandatory-arbitration
agreements.2 3 In 1988, Congress authorized alternative dispute resolution,
including arbitration, for "any civil action. . . if the parties consent to
arbitration.224 In a section entitled "Safeguards in Consent Cases" it is
220. Id. at 29 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473
U.S. 614, 628 (1985)).
221. Failure to denote how mandatory arbitration differs from other kinds of legitimate
voluntary arbitration is a common one in mandatory-arbitration literature. See, e.g., Reilly,
supra note 4, at 1213. See supra note 4 for explanation of Reilly's imprecise reading of
Gardner-Denver.
222. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
223. See generally A. Leo Levin & Deirdre Golash, Alternative Dispute Resolution in
Federal District Courts, 37 U. FLA. L. REV. 29 (1985); William Kinsland Edwards, Note,
"No Frills" Justice: North Carolina Experiments with Court-Ordered Arbitration, 66 N.C.
L. REV. 395 (1988) (relating experiences of North Carolina state courts).
224. 28 U.S.C. § 652(a)(A) (1988) (emphasis added). The statute which added 28
U.S.C. §§ 651-658 was experimental when enacted. It contained a repealer, effective five
years after November 19, 1988. See Section 906 of Title IX of Pub. L. 100-702, 102 Stat.
4664 (1988). Five years later the repealer was itself repealed. See Pub. L. 103-420, § 3(b),
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required that the arbitration procedures ensure that: "(1) consent to
arbitration is freely and knowingly obtained; and (2) no party or attorney is
prejudiced for refusing to participate in arbitration.2 25
The statute certainly does not directly override Gilmer's enforcement
of mandatory-arbitration agreements. It reveals, however, that Congress
had in mind for Court-annexed arbitration the certain retention of
arbitration's traditionally voluntary character. If Congress commanded that
limited amounts of voluntary, court-annexed arbitration may not be based
226on a consent-defying condition, Congress could not have intended the
judicial enforcement of involuntary, statutory-dispute arbitration under
adhesion contracts, the signing of which is a condition of employment.
The court-annexed arbitration statute demonstrates something more
vital: whether the arbitration of statutory disputes can be substituted for
judicial trials in federal court, and if so under what circumstances, is a
matter of congressional and not judicial concern. 22' The authority to create
magistrates, empower them to "hear and determine any pretrial matter
pending before [a federal district] court," and to enter a sentence for low-
grade criminal offenses, is exclusively a power of Congress. 228 The statute
on court-annexed arbitration demonstrates Congress' intent to dominate the
entire field of arbitration as a substitute for civil actions committed to
federal court jurisdiction. Its intent is further demonstrated by
congressional enactment of a statute prohibiting mandatory pre-dispute
arbitration in contracts between motor vehicle manufacturers and dealers.229
Even textualists would apparently consider congressional intent in the face
of congressional silence. The ADEA, interpreted in Gilmer, is silent on
arbitration of any kind. When that is combined with the inapplicability of
the FAA to involuntary arbitration, a class of arbitration that had no
existence when the FAA was enacted, the case for ignoring congressional
intent is materially, and perhaps fatally, weakened.
C. Congressional Conferral of the Right to Jury Trial
230Certain individual constitutional and statutory rights may be waived,
108 Stat. 4345 (1994).
225. 28 U.S.C. § 654(b)(2000).
226. Id. (ensuring consent to arbitration is given freely by the parties involved).
227. Congress is the source of federal court rulemaking power. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b)
(2000) ("Such rules [as prescribed by the Supreme Court] shall not abridge, enlarge or
modify any substantive right.").
228. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) (2000).
229. 21st Century Department of Justice Appropriation Authorization Act, Pub. L. No.
107-273, § 11028, 116 Stat. 1835-36 (2002) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1226).
230. Generally, effective waiver of constitutional and statutory rights must be knowingly
made and understood. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 811-12 & n.7 (1975)
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including the right to jury trial,23 ' but the question of whether there was an
effective waiver requires a court to determine whether contract terms were
inappropriately induced.232 It should follow that the kinds of inducements
used to exact the waiver of so important a right as the right to jury trial are
open to careful scrutiny. Whether they should include an employer's take-
it-or-leave-it offer of jury trial waiver as a condition of employment could
233be considered as open to debate. Whether Congress intended to take one
step forward, by expressly granting the right to jury trial in certain
employment statutes, including the ADEA and Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, and then take a step back by permitting employers to take
away the right through mandatory-arbitration clauses, seems not open to
question. A fair presumption ought to be that Congress, having positively
granted the right to jury trial in statutes now covered by mandatory-
arbitration clauses, did not intend the enforcement of agreements that
induce waiver of the right as a condition of being employed.
D. Congressional Authority to Confer Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Congress would likely have spoken with the kind of clarity it
employed, for example, in requiring a discrimination claimant's use of the
federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's processes as a
condition precedent to filing a federal statutory discrimination claim in
federal district court.2  If satisfaction of a condition precedent to filing
(waiving right to counsel).
231. FED. R. Civ. P. 38(d) provides that the failure of a party to demand a jury trial
constitutes waiver. See Segal v. Am. Cas. Co., 250 F. Supp. 936 (D. Md. 1966) (holding
that a jury trial is waived unless demanded following removal to federal court).
232. E.g., Austin Instrument, Inc. v. Loral Corp. 272 N.E.2d 533 (N.Y. 1971) (economic
duress voids commercial contract); Odorizzi v. Bloomfield School Dist., 54 Cal. Rptr. 533,
539 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1966) (undue influence voids employment contract).
233. State courts have relied upon a public policy justification to hold that some
constitutional rights cannot be waived in any employment situation. For example, an
employer may not fire an employee for complying with a summons to jury duty. See Nees
v. Hocks, 536 P.2d 512 (Or. 1975); Reuther v. Fowler & Williams, Inc., 386 A.2d 119 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1978). But cf Leasing Serv. Corp. v. Crane, 804 F.2d 828, 832-33 (4th Cir.
1986) (citing cases from Second and Sixth Circuits for proposition that "[t]he Seventh
Amendment right ... can be knowingly and intentionally waived by contract."); Westside-
Marrero Jeep Eagle, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., Inc., 56 F. Supp. 2d 694, 706 (E.D. La. 1999)
("The Supreme Court, however, has long recognized that a private litigant may waive its
fight to a jury in civil cases.").
234. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 creates and defines the powers of the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission. It makes the filing of a charge with the EEOC the first required
step in the process of filing a claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5(f)(3) (providing that "[e]ach United States district court and each United States
court of a place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States shall have jurisdiction of
actions brought under this subchapter").
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was commanded with such specificity, Congress would almost certainly
have been equally specific in conferring on employer defendants in
statutory-claim cases the opportunity not merely to delay but to avoid
entirely the exercise of federal court jurisdiction.
The statutes defining federal court subject matter jurisdiction tend to
demonstrate that its conferral is exclusively a matter of congressional and
not judicial discretion.235 The Gilmer decision transfers a sizeable portion
of this power to employers. The decision's approved "waiver" might be
viewed as but one of several conditions an employee or job applicant must
meet in order to gain employment or to remain employed. But federal
court venue, subject matter jurisdiction, and the statutory right to jury trial
can hardly be equated with legitimately imposed conditions of
employment, such as the obligation to work eight hours per day, or a night
shift.
That Congress could not have intended judicial enforcement of
statutory-claim, mandatory-arbitration clauses is further demonstrated by
envisioning a regime in which all employers used statutory-claim,
236mandatory-arbitration clauses. This would be tantamount to a
congressional amendment repealing the subject matter jurisdiction of
federal courts for all federal statutes providing employee rights, including
the Family and Medical Leave Act,237 the Fair Labor Standards Act, among
others, as well as statutes providing protection against invidious
discrimination. The hypothetical amendment would provide that employer
defendants in statutory-claim cases may, at their option, move cases from
federal court to an arbitration forum in which all governing procedural
rules are established unilaterally by the employer. So extraordinary a result
could only be achieved through the legislative process.
IX. CONCLUSION
So long as arbitrators do not routinely hear statutory-claim cases on a
pro bono basis, mandatory-arbitration processes for statutory claims cannot
235. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (defining cases over which federal courts have subject matter
jurisdiction). By 28 U.S.C. § 1331, Congress conferred on federal courts subject matter
jurisdiction over federal question claims, including federal statutory claims. But, even the
Rules Enabling Act, by which Congress conferred limited rulemaking authority on the
courts, did not give the federal courts any power to define venue or subject matter
jurisdiction. See Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1941). But cf. Ferens v. John
Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516 (1990) (interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) to allow transfer of a case
into a federal district court from which it would have originally been time-barred).
236. In both the consumer and employment contexts, mandatory-arbitration clauses are
on the rise. See Charles Haddad & Aixa M. Pascual, When You Want To Sue-But Can't,
Bus. WEEK, June 10, 2002, at 46.
237. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654.
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be "properly designed., 238  The plainly involuntary nature of the
agreements; employers' unilateral authority to structure the governing
procedural format; the shared, but potentially unaffordable, arbitrator's fee;
and the appearance of partiality associated with arbitrator fees paid entirely
by the employer are each, alone, and surely in the aggregate, structural
elements that lack fundamental fairness. Attempts to create elements of
"due process" in statutory-claim mandatory arbitration amount to irrelevant
tinkering.139 Even if they were somehow binding on mandatory-arbitration
parties-as they are not-they would be unable to address effectively these
core elements of irremediable structural unfairness. Even if the federal
rules of civil procedure were in some way made applicable to all
mandatory-arbitration proceedings, arbitrators hearing these cases would
still have to be compensated either by a shared fee or solely by the
employer. When the procedural infirmities inherent in mandatory-
arbitration processes are added, the case in support of the Gilmer result
collapses under its own weight.24 °  Congress can reclaim its Article I
constitutional authority to define the subject matter jurisdiction of federal
courts by amending the Federal Arbitration Act so as to make clear what
should have been obvious: arbitration, within the meaning of the statute,
means voluntary arbitration.
Mandatory-arbitration regimes for statutory disputes also likely
discourage incentives to promote their resolution by voluntary arbitration
or other alternatives to judicial trials that might be used to resolve them.
For example, special courts or commissions with exclusive jurisdiction
over various employment claims might more seriously be considered but
for the lack of incentive to do so in a mandatory-arbitration regime.
Mandatory arbitration thus takes away from both employers and employees
the opportunity to sort out the kinds of statutory-claim cases for which
voluntary arbitration would be a mutually advantageous substitute for
241
judicial litigation . Yet, vast numbers of individuals' employment
238. Estreicher, supra note 91, at 1349.
239. See, e.g., Paul H. Haagen, New Wineskins for New Wine: The Need to Encourage
Fairness in Mandatory Arbitration, 40 ARIZ. L. REv. 1039, 1044 (1998) (stating that the
best solution is to make mandatory arbitration as fair as possible).
240. See S. Pierre Paret, ADR Legislation of the 107th Congress--An Overview, Disp.
RESOL. TIMES, Oct.-Dec. 2002, at 4 (providing tables of those bills limiting and those
expanding ADR). They include: Civil Rights Protection Act of 2001, S.163, 107th Cong.
(2001) (prohibiting mandatory arbitration of employment discrimination claims); Consumer
Credit Fair Dispute Resolution Act of 2001, S.192, 107th Cong. (2001) (prohibiting
mandatory arbitration in consumer credit); Arbitration Choice Act, H.R. 815, 107th Cong.
(2001) (prohibiting mandatory-arbitration clauses in employment contracts as a condition of
employment).
241. The American Arbitration Association (AAA), with its strong emphasis on dispute
resolution education, has played a major role in promoting voluntary arbitration over
litigation, even though, somewhat inconsistently, it supports mandatory arbitration for
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disputes would fall within a range of being mutually arbitration-attractive
to both employers and employees. Mandatory arbitration stands in the way
242of what might have been-and could yet be -an institutional education
campaign, supported by private and governmental entities, on the virtues of
voluntary arbitration for the resolution of statutory claims.
statutory claims. See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 108 n.* (2001)
(recording that an amicus curiae brief was filed by AAA on behalf of Circuit City).
242. See generally Frank E. A. Sander, Alternative Methods of Dispute Resolution: An
Overview, 37 U. FLA. L. REv. 1 (1985).
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